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PROCUREMENT INTEGRITY IN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS: 
A CASE STUDY OF ARMY CONTRACTING OFFICER 
CORRUPTION IN OPERATIONS IRAQI AND ENDURING 





The purpose of this project is to analyze the conditions that enabled corruption of Army 
Contingency Contracting Officers (CCOs) during Operations Iraqi Freedom and 
Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF) by applying occupational fraud theory, specifically the 
classic sociological/criminological Fraud Triangle model, to determine its validity in a 
contingency operation. By examining the contracting environment in OIF and OEF and 
utilizing the conceptual framework of occupational fraud theory, I identify the distinctive 
situational elements of a contingency operation that influence an individual’s decision to 
commit fraud and thus affect the probability of fraud occurring in contingency 
operations. By analyzing the procurement fraud environment in OIF and OEF using an 
occupational fraud model, I provide the foundation for understanding why fraud occurs in 
the context of contingency operations with the intent of preventing future procurement 
integrity violations. Reducing instances of fraud directly impacts the appropriate 
utilization of taxpayer funding and the operational readiness of the warfighter, as well as 
enhances the reputation and standing of the Army CCO Corps. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I present the purpose, research question, and methodology for the 
analysis of the corruption of Army contracting officers in Operations Iraqi Freedom and 
Enduring Freedom through the application of occupational fraud theory. I also discuss this 
report’s scope and organization. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Army contingency contracting officers (CCOs) have been providing critical 
contracting support to forces in Iraq and Afghanistan for nearly a decade. They, along with 
other Department of Defense (DoD) contracting officers, enabled the obligation of more than 
$206 billion on contracts for equipment, supplies, and services from 2002 through 2011 in 
support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF; Thibault 
et al., 2011b, p. 2). Unfortunately, a small but growing number of CCOs chose personal 
enrichment over public good and eclipsed the outstanding efforts and integrity of the 
majority of CCOs; in the process, this minority of Army CCOs broke the law, betrayed Army 
values,1 and violated their country’s trust. Investigation and conviction rates indicate that 
Army CCOs are involved in the commission of fraud by a significantly higher percentage in 
comparison to contracting officers in the other Services, despite being the minority of 
contracting personnel in theater (Gansler et al., 2007).  
The most well-known case of CCO corruption in OIF is that of Major John 
Cockerham, an Army CCO who was sentenced to 17.5 years in jail after admitting to taking 
more than $9 million in bribes for awarding contracts at Camp Arifijan, Kuwait, in 2004 and 
2005 (Department of Justice, 2009). More than a simple bribery case, Major Cockerham’s 
case involved a complex conspiracy that as of July 2011 involved 17 individuals who had 
pled or been found guilty, as well as four other individuals pending trial (Department of 
Justice, 2011). Of the 17 convicted, three individuals, in addition to Cockerham, were Army 
CCOs (Majors Momon, Murray, and Pressley), while another (Major Davis) committed 
                                                 
1 The seven core Army values are loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage 
(United States Army, 2011a). 
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suicide after confessing to an Army investigator that she had accepted bribes (Schmitt & 
Glanz, 2007). A fifth CCO (Sergeant First Class [SFC] Evick) is currently awaiting trial. 
Although the dollar value and number of personnel involved in this case may represent an 
anomaly, Army CCO fraud commission is unfortunately too common.  
Several years into operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, corruption in the Army CCO 
Corps joined other contract-related incidents (e.g., Abu-Ghraib, Nisoor Square),2 garnering 
media attention, causing public outrage, and sparking congressional interest. These high-
profile events reflected fundamental vulnerabilities in the Army’s contracting system, many 
of which existed well before the commencement of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as 
documented in numerous government agencies’ reports (Government Accountability Office 
[GAO], 2011a; Gansler et al., 2007; Commission on Wartime Contracting, 2010). The 
scandals, however, compelled the federal government to acknowledge the systemic issues 
relating to contracting, specifically contingency contracting, and confront them.  
An early initiative was the creation in 2008 of an independent and bipartisan 
commission to review contingency contracting and provide recommendations to Congress. 
Known as the Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC) in Iraq and Afghanistan, it has 
issued several interim and special reports assessing contracting for reconstruction, logistics, 
and security, as well as documenting the extent of fraud, waste, and abuse. In its final report 
to Congress, released in August 2011, the CWC reported that between $10.3 and $18.5 
billion has been lost to fraud associated with contracts in these operations (Thibault et al., 
2011b, p. 90). This dollar amount represents 5% to 9% of the $206 billion spent thus far in 
contingency contracts in OIF and OEF.  
The staggering sums in the CWC report made national headlines, prompting renewed 
calls for increased oversight and regulatory reforms in federal contracting, specifically in 
contingency contracting. Senator Claire McCaskill, who, along with Senator Jim Webb, had 
championed the commission’s charter, called the findings “disgusting” and “shocking” 
(McCaskill, 2011). The extent of the fraud in OIF and OEF is certainly distressing and 
                                                 
2 Abu Ghraib: The Army utilized an existing Department of the Interior Blanket Purchase Agreement for 
Information Technology to sole-source its prisoner interrogation requirement, later determined out of scope 
(Department of the Interior, 2004); Nisoor Square: Blackwater contractor personnel performing private security 
are accused of killing 14 unarmed Iraqi civilians and wounding 18 others (Raghavan, 2007).  
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shameful, but is it surprising? The CWC implied otherwise when noting that its fraud 
estimate was consistent with the statistics the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 
(ACFE) had reported. The ACFE, the world’s largest anti-fraud organization, has conducted 
numerous studies and surveys regarding the size and scope of occupational fraud, finding that 
the typical U.S. organization loses 7% of its revenues to fraud annually (Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners [ACFE], 2008). If the percentage of fraud in OIF and OEF is 
consistent with the general occupational fraud rate, then I hypothesize that classic 
occupational fraud theory can explain the occurrence of fraud in OIF and OEF and, by 
extrapolation, fraud by contracting personnel in a generic contingency operation. 
B.  PURPOSE 
The purpose of this project is to analyze the conditions that enabled corruption of 
Army CCOs during OIF and OEF by applying occupational fraud theory, specifically the 
classic sociological/criminological Fraud Triangle model (Cressey, 1953), to determine its 
validity in a contingency operation. By examining the contracting environment in OIF and 
OEF and utilizing the conceptual framework of occupational fraud theory, I identify the 
distinctive situational elements of a contingency operation that influence an individual’s 
decision to commit fraud and thus affect the probability of fraud occurring in contingency 
operations.  
By analyzing the procurement fraud environment in OIF and OEF using an 
occupational fraud model, I provide the foundation for understanding why fraud occurs in the 
context of contingency operations with the intent of preventing future procurement integrity 
violations. Reducing instances of fraud directly impacts the appropriate utilization of 
taxpayer funding and the operational readiness of the warfighter, as well as enhances the 
reputation and standing of the Army CCO Corps. 
C.  RESEARCH QUESTION 
The primary objective of this research project is to answer the following question: 
How does occupational fraud theory account for the corruption of Army CCOs in OIF and 
OEF? Understanding what motivates a CCO’s corrupt behavior in a contingency operation 
and identifying the enabling characteristics of the contracting environment is critical in 
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preventing and deterring fraud in future contingency operations. Through a holistic analysis 
of CCO corruption in a contingency operation, the Army will be better postured to 
implement an effective and comprehensive anti-fraud program for its deployed contracting 
organizations. 
D. SCOPE  
I have limited this report to corruption, substantiated through criminal conviction for 
fraud, of deployed Army CCOs supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Inherent in 
the scope of this report is terminology that requires further definition. Fraud is a generic 
term, and thus there are many definitions and classifications. In essence, however, fraud 
always entails deception or willful misrepresentation. In this report, I focus on occupational 
fraud, and specifically corruption, which is the most common fraud scheme. The ACFE 
defines occupational fraud as “the use of one’s occupation for personal enrichment through 
the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing organization’s resources or assets” 
(ACFE, 2008, p. 6). This definition is very broad and covers a wide range of activities, 
everything from stealing pens to sophisticated financial accounting schemes; this definition 
also applies to a variety of perpetrators, including employees, managers, and executives. 
Thus, the ACFE further classifies occupational fraud into three major categories: asset 
misappropriations, corruption, and fraudulent statements. The ACFE (2008) defines 
corruption as 
schemes in which fraudsters use their influence in business transactions in a 
way that violates their duty to their employers in order to obtain a benefit for 
themselves or someone else. For example, employees might receive or offer 
bribes, extort funds from third parties, or engage in conflicts of interest. 
(p. 10)  
A complete breakdown of the ACFE’s Occupational Fraud and Abuse Classification 
System appears at Appendix A. The DoD (2003) defines fraud from its own perspective and 
provides additional examples in its guide for investigators, Criminal Investigations of Fraud 
Offenses: 
Any intentional deception designed to deprive the United States unlawfully of 
something of value or to secure from the United States a benefit, privilege, 
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allowance, or consideration to which he or she is not entitled. Such practices 
include 
 Offering payment or accepting bribes or gratuities. 
 Making false statements. 
 Submitting false claims. 
 Using false weights or measures. 
 Evading or corrupting inspectors or other officials. 
 Deceiving either by suppressing the truth or misrepresenting material 
fact. 
 Adulterating or substituting materials. 
 Falsifying records and books of accounts. 
 Arranging for secret profits, kickbacks, or commissions or conspiring 
to use any of these devices. 
 Conflict of interest cases, criminal irregularities, and the unauthorized 
disclosure of official information relating to procurement. (p. 7) 
However, this definition encompasses fraud by both government employees and 
external parties (e.g., private contractors). Because in this report I focus on corruption, I am 
concerned solely with the government employee, the Army CCO, and thus I do not address 
the contractor participation in fraud. 
For the purposes of this report, the term CCO refers to Army Acquisition Corps 
(AAC) military personnel, either active or reserve components, assigned to a position with 
the responsibility of awarding contracts and coded as a 51C, Contracting and Industrial 
Management, one of five career specializations within the AAC. According to the 
Department of the Army’s (2010) pamphlet on officer career management, the 51C is 
assigned to provide contracting support worldwide to expeditionary operations throughout 
the entire spectrum of military operations. These officers will lead contingency contracting 
teams, contracting efforts for installations, military construction, and weapon systems 
procurement offices. They execute contract awards and contract administration management 
and industrial management/oversight at contractor facilities worldwide. Officers coordinate 
with warfighters and program managers for requirement determination. These officers are 
responsible for making determinations on contracts awards and developing contracting 
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support plans (Department of the Army, 2010, p. 391). A CCO can also be a 
noncommissioned officer (NCO), performing the same function and with the same 
responsibilities as the 51C officer. The Army established the Military Occupational Specialty 
(MOS) 51C, Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (AL&T) Contracting NCO, in 
December 2006 (United States Army, 2011b).3  
The scope of this report comprises the contingency operations of OIF and OEF, 
which refer to U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, respectively. I provide more 
information on contingency operations in Chapter III. Although OIF transitioned to 
Operation New Dawn on October 1, 2010, to mark the end of the U.S. forces’ combat 
operations in Iraq and to emphasize stability operations, I utilize the nomenclature of OIF 
throughout for continuity purposes. Some contracting support for OIF and OEF took place 
outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, notably in Kuwait. In this report, I include fraud by CCOs 
who were forward deployed to provide contracting support in OIF and OEF, even if they 
were not actually operating within the geographic boundaries of Iraq and Afghanistan. 
E. LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS  
Inherent in the covert nature of fraud is that it is difficult to accurately identify and 
measure. Thus, although there have been numerous investigations and prosecutions of Army 
CCOs, the true extent of Army CCO fraud is unknown. Realistically, many instances may go 
undetected, thus preventing the Army from determining or definitively quantifying the true 
extent of CCO corruption. This limitation becomes even more pronounced considering the 
current constrained resource environment, which could limit investigation and prosecution, in 
addition to the obvious stake of corrupt parties to prevent their exposure. Despite the 
challenges associated with identifying Army CCOs as perpetrators of fraud and holding them 
accountable, numerous Army CCOs are serving prison sentences for their crimes. These 
cases, like that of Major Cockerham and his accomplices, represent the existence of 
corruption, which is one category of occupational fraud and which contributed to the 
potential loss of upwards of $18 billion in OIF and OEF. The fact that this fraud occurred in 
                                                 
3 Prior to this date, MOS92 series (Logistics) NCOs were utilized to fill 51C positions, and contracting was not 
a permanent NCO career track.  
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a contingency operation provides a unique element in the application of classic occupational 
fraud models to understanding why and how the fraud took place. 
Although the models I utilize in this report have existed for decades and fraud 
examiners have adopted them as standard methodology, I do not claim that they are perfect 
tools; no model can adequately predict or explain every single occurrence of fraud. 
Additionally, I do not attempt to address every theory regarding occupational fraud. The field 
of research encompassing occupational fraud continues to evolve, and researchers have 
identified and will continue to identify weaknesses inherent in the existing models by 
conducting follow-on studies and proposing new models. Although there is not a one-size-
fits-all approach to occupational fraud, my research objective is to determine how the classic 
Fraud Triangle model explains corruption of Army CCOs in OIF and OEF and, indirectly, 
other contingency operations. 
I did not conduct any personal interviews with investigators or convicted fraudsters; 
instead, I relied on publicly available accounts of their cases, obtaining most of the data from 
government reports, publically available legal documents, and other media sources. The 
CCOs prosecuted for fraud offenses have, for the most part, kept the motivation for their 
actions private. It would be pure conjecture to attempt to provide motivations for the 
fraudsters in specific cases; therefore, in this report I suggest generalized motivations based 
on findings from previous occupational fraud research and the conditions relevant to the 
cases. Some may contend that an in-depth analysis of the environment is unnecessary 
because fraud is solely the byproduct of greed. Although greed is certainly a factor in 
occupational fraud, it is too simplistic an explanation for the phenomenon of CCO corruption 
in OIF and OEF. Joseph Wells (1997), founder of the ACFE and a notable examiner and 
researcher of fraud, observed that greed as a motive for fraud is subjective, and in turn 
problematic, in terms of providing a metric to predict behavior. He concluded, “There is little 
we can say about greed as a motive that will help us detect or deter occupational fraud” 
(p. 514).  
Although I focus on CCOs, other Army uniformed personnel committed the majority 
of fraud in OIF and OEF via their indirect involvement in the contracting process (i.e., acting 
as project purchasing officers, field ordering officers, and contracting officer 
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representatives). Although committing fraud was a clear violation of their duty as 
government employees, the significant difference for the purposes of this report is that these 
individuals were not acquisition professionals, and procurement was not their primary duty; 
rather, they were tasked to perform additional duties by, and on behalf of, a non-contracting 
parent organization. I assume, however, that my findings are applicable to personnel in these 
positions to some degree, as well as to other Service and agency contracting officers to a 
much greater degree.  
Similarly, although OIF and OEF are presented as case studies for the application of 
occupational fraud theory to explain the corruption of CCOs in contingency operations, I 
utilize these operations to allow for generalizations with any contingency operation. 
Although each contingency operation is unique based on mission, location, duration, and 
other operational dynamics, there are characteristics that are potentially present in a 
contingency operation that could affect an individual’s propensity to commit fraud based on 
a variety of perceived pressures, opportunities, and rationalizations. 
F. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In my research for this project, I undertook a literature review of contingency 
contracting with a narrower focus on procurement fraud in contingency environments, 
specifically fraud that occurred in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the 
literature review, I include applicable government reports and testimony from the GAO, the 
DoD and special Inspectors General, the CWC, and the Commission on Army Acquisition 
and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations (commonly referred to as the Gansler 
Report). I obtained fraud case information and data regarding the number of ongoing 
investigations and prosecutions involving Army CCOs from the public records of the 
Department of Justice and supporting investigative agencies.  
In the literature review, I also include an examination of occupational fraud theory, 
including the research of Sutherland (1983), Cressey (1953); Wolfe and Hermanson (2004); 
Albrecht, Howe, and Romney (1984); and Hollinger and Clark (1983). Occupational fraud 
theory provides the explanatory models enabling an understanding of the motivation(s) 
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behind fraud in order to better assess organizational risk and identify effective prevention and 
detection mechanisms.  
Starting from the data on CCO fraud commission provided by the Department of 
Justice and Special Inspector Generals and utilizing the framework provided by the 
occupational fraud models, I analyze the contracting environment prior to and during 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to identify elements that influenced pressures, 
opportunities, and rationalizations that led to Army CCO corruption. The Army’s Criminal 
Investigative Division’s (CID) Major Procurement Fraud Unit (MPFU) conducted an 
assessment of the contracting environment in Iraq over a several-month–long period in 2005 
and identified various significant conditions that were conducive to fraud (Ethridge, 
Greenway, & Kilgore, 2007). Many of these elements are likely to exist in any contingency 
operation and therefore provide a relevant basis for the application of the fraud theory to 
account for CCO corruption. 
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT 
I have organized this report into four chapters. In Chapter I, Introduction, I provide a 
brief background regarding fraud in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to establish that 
occupational fraud was a widespread and costly problem in OIF and OEF as contingency 
operations. I then present the research question and methodology for conducting the research, 
as well as identify the scope, limitations, and assumptions that impact the research 
conclusions. In Chapter II, I present a consolidated review of occupational fraud theory and 
include prominent fraud models, notably Cressey’s (1953) Fraud Triangle, to provide the 
foundation for addressing the problem of fraud in contingencies. In Chapter III, I provide an 
overview of contingency contracting and then utilize the framework I presented in Chapter II 
to examine how the contracting environment prior to OIF and OEF, as well as the attributes 
of OIF and OEF as contingency operations, enabled fraud. In Chapter IV, I present the 
conclusions and propose areas for further research. 
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H.  SUMMARY  
In this chapter, I provided an overview of the body of the research of this report. I 
presented the research question, scope, and methodology of the research. Finally, I provided 
a general outline of the report. 
In the next chapter, I provide the basic theoretical framework of occupational fraud 
by presenting notable research and the explanatory models originating from it. My overview 
of occupational fraud theory serves as an informed foundation for Chapter III, in which I 
analyze the contracting environment, both prior to and during OIF and OEF, to identify the 
characteristics of these recent contingency operations that enabled the corruption of U.S. 
Army CCOs. In order to do so, I present the various explanations of fraud causation, which 
are fundamental to understanding this corruption. 
=
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 11 -=
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli 
II. OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD THEORY 
In this chapter, I present an overview of occupational fraud theory from the 
conceptualization of the white-collar criminal to subsequent seminal research studies, from 
which the most widely accepted explanatory model of financially motivated crime, the Fraud 
Triangle, originated. In the majority of recent studies, researchers have focused on revisions 
and expansions of the Fraud Triangle in an attempt to provide a more comprehensive 
representation of occupational fraud in today’s complex and technological society.  
A. BACKGROUND 
Despite the enormous economic and social impact caused by occupational fraud, 
relatively little research in the area has been conducted (Wells, 1997). With a recent spate of 
financial crimes fresh in the public’s conscience, however, occupational fraud as a field of 
study has been garnering considerable attention. Theories are proving relevant in accounting 
for the commission of crimes making front-page news, ranging from Bernard Madoff’s 
investment fraud to insider trading by the hedge fund Galleon Group’s founder, Raj 
Rajaratnam. With the massive size and scope of potential fraud based on the highly 
networked, computerized, and global characteristics of financial systems today, 
understanding the enablers of fraud is more important than ever. 
Occupational fraud, as a separate field of research, developed out of criminological 
and sociological studies in the early 1900s. Up to that time, most research regarding crime 
had focused on violent offenders, such as murderers and rapists. Research on financially 
motivated crime was minimal and limited primarily to theft and burglary. Edwin H. 
Sutherland, a sociologist and university professor, was one of the first to undertake a 
systematic study of financial crimes and fraud perpetrators. In doing so, Sutherland 
repudiated the commonly held theories of the early 20th century regarding the origins of 
criminal behavior: notably, that criminal behavior is caused by genetics, which is exacerbated 
by environmental conditions like poverty. Sutherland (1983) proposed a contrary thesis that 
“social and personal pathologies are not an adequate explanation of criminal behavior” (p. 5).  
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Based on the research he conducted, much of it on the upper class and business elite, 
Sutherland concluded that criminal behavior is learned. This learning takes place through 
social interaction and communication with others and thus is largely dependent upon the 
environment. He postulated a hypothesis of differential association in which he described 
criminal behavior as 
learned in association with those who define such criminal behavior favorably 
and in isolation from those who define it unfavorably, and that a person in an 
appropriate situation engages in such criminal behavior if and only if the 
weight of the favorable definitions exceeds the weight of the unfavorable 
definitions. (Sutherland, 1983, p. 240) 
In the textbook Sutherland co-authored with Cressey and Luckenbill (1992), 
Principles of Criminology, which remains standard course reading for criminology students 
to this day, Sutherland further expanded the theory of differential association by outlining its 
nine essential points: 
 Criminal behavior is learned. 
 Criminal behavior is learned while interacting with other persons in a 
process of communication. 
 The principal part of the learning of criminal behavior occurs within 
intimate personal groups. 
 When criminal behavior is learned, the learning includes techniques of 
committing the crime, which are sometimes very complicated, sometimes 
simple, and the specific direction of motives, drives, rationalizations, and 
attitudes. 
 The specific direction of motives and drives is learned from definitions of 
the legal codes as favorable or unfavorable. 
 A person becomes delinquent because of an excess of definitions 
favorable to violation of the law over definitions unfavorable to violation 
of the law. 
 Differential associations may vary in frequency, duration, priority, and 
intensity. 
 The process of learning criminal behavior by association with criminal and 
anti-criminal patterns involves all of the mechanisms that are involved in 
any other learning. 
 Although criminal behavior is an expression of general needs and values, 
it is not explained by those needs and values, because non-criminal 
behavior is an expression of the same needs and values. (pp. 88–91) 
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In shifting the focus away from social and economic determinants (e.g., 
personal/family background and poverty/wealth levels), the theory of differential association 
represented a new paradigm in the field of criminology. In his research, Sutherland also 
provided an impetus for researchers to conduct additional studies of crimes that members of 
the upper echelons of society, as well as corporations, had committed. In fact, Sutherland is 
responsible for coining the term white-collar crime in 1939 (Wells, 1997, p. 9). In his book 
White Collar Crime, published 10 years later,4 Sutherland (1983) described the term 
“principally to refer to businessmen and executives” (p. 265). The term has since come to 
encompass virtually all economic and financial crimes.  
The impact of Sutherland’s research on the field of criminology is far-reaching; the 
American Society of Criminology’s [ASC] premier award recognizing exceptional 
contribution to theory or research is named in his honor, the Edwin H. Sutherland award 
(ASC, 2011). Sutherland and his theory of differential association, with its focus on the 
“drives, rationalizations, and motives” (Wells, 1997, p. 9) of criminals, directly influenced 
subsequent research on occupational fraud. Much of the current literature in the area of 
occupational fraud is predicated on Sutherland’s groundbreaking studies of crimes 
businesspeople, managers, and corporations have committed.  
B. CRESSEY’S FRAUD TRIANGLE 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, one of the premier figures in the field of occupational fraud 
theory was a student of Sutherland’s, Donald R. Cressey. Upon his passing in 1987, The New 
York Times lauded Cressey as one of the “nation’s leading experts on the sociology of crime” 
and noted that he was the author of “several highly regarded books on the causes and 
prevention of crime” (“Prof. Donald R. Cressey,” 1987). Cressey incorporated Sutherland’s 
differential association theory while researching a wide variety of areas, including organized 
crime and criminal rehabilitation.  
An early research undertaking, however, ultimately became a landmark study and 
generated the classic Fraud Triangle model for which Cressey is best known. While 
Sutherland focused on high-level corporate executives who committed fraud against the 
                                                 
4 For this research, I utilized the 1983 publication version, a new edition of the original work. 
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public or company shareholders, Cressey focused his efforts on low-level embezzlers, 
interviewing more than 200 inmates at Midwest prisons (Wells, 1997). He published his 
research findings in Other People’s Money: A Study in the Social Psychology of 
Embezzlement. In it, he referred to an embezzler as a trust violator, someone who had earned 
a position of trust in an organization but later violated this trust when exposed to a given 
pressure. Cressey’s (1953) hypothesis was that 
trusted persons become trust violators when they conceive of themselves as 
having a financial problem that is non-shareable, are aware this problem can 
be secretly resolved by violation of the position of financial trust, and are able 
to apply to their own conduct in that situation verbalizations which enable 
them to adjust their conceptions of themselves as trusted persons with their 
conceptions of themselves as users of the entrusted funds or property. (p. 30) 
Central to this hypothesis are these three elements: the non-shareable financial 
problem or pressure that provides the incentive to act, the rationalization that enables an 
individual to believe the criminal act is justified, and the opportunity, including the skill and 
information, to commit the act. Over time, Cressey’s hypothesis became known as the Fraud 
Triangle, with each of the three elements representing a leg of the triangle, as shown in 
Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1.   Fraud Triangle 
(Wells, 1997, p. 11) 
It is important to note that Cressey (1953) believed all three elements had to be 
present, a conjuncture of events, in order for the fraud to occur: “The absence of any one or 
all of the events in the process will preclude the criminal violation of financial trust, together 
with other information, that when the entire process takes place trust violation results” 
(p. 34).  
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1.  Non-Shareable Financial Pressures 
The first leg of the triangle, the non-shareable financial pressure, provides a critical 
differentiation in terms of the fraud commission relative to why an individual has not 
previously violated the trust of his or her employer. The existence of this pressure explains 
the responses of the research subjects—the inmates incarcerated for fraud offenses—when 
asked why they had refrained from fraud at an earlier time: They said, “There was no need 
for it like there was this time”; “The idea never entered my head”; and “I thought it was 
dishonest then, but this time it didn’t seem dishonest at first” (Cressey, 1953, p. 33). The 
pressure serves as a catalyst, of which Cressey (1953) identified six types:  
 violation of ascribed obligations, 
 problems resulting from personal failure, 
 business reversals, 
 physical isolation, 
 status gaining, and 
 employer–employee relations.  
Violation of ascribed obligations refers to an individual’s inability to pay a debt, 
compounded by the feeling that revealing the situation would make it worse or lead to 
additional feelings of guilt and shame. Thus, the individual feels that he or she cannot admit 
his or her problem to another party, even one in a position to help. Frequently, this inability 
to ask for help has to do with the position of trust the individual holds, at work or home, 
which is accompanied by expectations from the organization (employer and employees), 
family (spouse and child), or society in general. Thus, as Cressey (1953) explained, 
“admission of the loss would amount to an admission of unworthiness” (p. 41). Problems 
resulting from personal failures can arise from gambling, drug use, credit card abuse, or poor 
investment decisions, as examples. The individual feels that the problem is a “consequence 
of his ‘own bad judgment,’ ‘own fault,’ or ‘own stupidity’ (Cressey, 1953, p. 42). Cressey 
differentiated the third type, business reversals, from personal failures to reflect an 
individual’s belief that business-related financial problems are beyond his or her control and 
are purely the result of external factors, such as poor market conditions or high interest rates. 
The fourth category, physical isolation, refers to an individual’s belief that no one can 
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understand his or her problem or assist in solving it; this belief is independent of feelings of 
fear or shame that would preclude admission. An individual incurs problems related to status-
gaining when he or she aspires to status or social standing, a keeping-up-with-the-Joneses 
mentality. The final category refers to problems associated with the employer–employee 
relationship. In these cases, an individual may feel that he or she is not being treated fairly, 
compensated appropriately, or appreciated for his or her contributions. The individual does 
not believe that he or she can share his or her feelings without retribution or negative impact. 
In all these categories of non-shareable pressures exists the motivation for the trust violation: 
embezzlement in Cressey’s research, but inclusive of other occupational fraud schemes as 
well.  
2.  Opportunity 
According to Cressey, there are two prerequisites that make up the second leg of the 
triangle, perceived opportunity: the individual must possess general information, as well as 
the technical knowledge to execute the fraud secretly. The first part, general information, is 
basically the individual’s recognition that the trust can be violated (i.e., the individual 
recognizes his or her fiduciary capability to execute the fraud). These individuals recognize 
that their position provides the potential to alleviate their non-shareable problem. Technical 
knowledge is also often tied to the position; the same skills required to gain and keep the 
position can be used to commit the fraud. Cressey (1953) noted that “persons trained to carry 
on the routine duties of a position of trust have at the same time been trained at whatever 
skills are necessary for the violation of that position” (p. 82). Thus, in execution of his or her 
crime, an individual does not deviate much from his or her typical occupational routine (i.e., 
the one in which he or she is skilled). Cressey (1953) observed, “Accountants use checks 
which they have been entrusted to dispose of, sales clerks withhold receipts, bankers 
manipulate seldom-used accounts or withhold deposits, real estate men use deposits entrusted 
to them, and so on” (p. 84). It is not, however, until the opportunity and non-shareable 
problem are accompanied by rationalization that an individual will commit fraud.  
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3.  Rationalization 
The third leg of the triangle is rationalization, or as Cressey (1953) also referred to it, 
the “vocabulary of adjustment” (p. 93). This is the process by which an individual convinces 
himself that the fraud being committed is “(a) non-criminal, (b) justified, or (c) as a part of a 
general irresponsibility for which he is not completely accountable” (Cressey, 1953, p. 93). 
This rationalization happens prior to the execution of the fraud and is part of the motivation, 
allowing the trust violator to frame his or her action in such a way as to make it acceptable 
behavior. The rationalizations are unique and dependent on the individual and the crime. 
Cressey, however, delineated three types of offenders with their own rationalizations: 
independent businesspeople, long-term violators, and absconders.  
Common excuses that independent businesspeople who had misused client funds 
adopted include “(a) that they were merely borrowing the money which they converted, or 
(b) that the funds entrusted to them were really theirs” (Cressey, 1953, p. 102). These 
individuals have a much easier time justifying their actions by using the terminology of 
borrowing versus stealing, even when they have no intent of actually returning the money. 
For some businesspeople, committing fraud is made easier by the fact it is a rational 
extension of how their business is conducted. Additionally, because these individuals are still 
performing their normal, legitimate duties, they avoid seeing their act as criminal.  
Long-term violators also incorporate the rationalization of borrowing, but because 
their crimes occur over extended periods, additional rationalizations are also common. 
Examples of supplemental rationalizations include that they embezzled “to keep their 
families from shame, disgrace, or poverty, that theirs was a case of ‘necessity,’ that their 
employers were cheating them and were dishonest, so that trust violation seemed justified” 
(Cressey, 1953, p. 114). Cressey noted that the long-term violators have difficulty justifying 
their actions as time goes on, as they start to think about the potential consequences of their 
actions and the possibility of a prison sentence or other penalties. Many ultimately 
acknowledge that all they had done was trade one non-shareable problem (the catalyst) for 
another (the embezzlement). 
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The final group of offenders is the absconders, those who take the money and run. 
Cressey found that physical isolation is a common theme among this type of offender. This 
group has fewer family ties and less meaningful group associations. They tend to be in 
positions of lower status (e.g., clerks or drivers) versus an executive or accountant. These 
characteristics influence the decision to flee but also affect the type of rationalizations that 
absconders utilize. The absconders justify their behavior by telling themselves they do not 
care what happens to them, that living honestly is impossible, and that the criminality 
intrinsic in all people had come out in them. While independent businesspeople keep working 
and convincing themselves that they are normal and it is the situation that is bad, the 
absconder believes it is himself that is bad, blaming a personal defect instead of an external 
situation. However, both are rationalizations for socially unacceptable behavior, just with 
different sources.  
Regardless of the type of rationalization, Cressey found that rationalization occurs 
before the crime takes place versus afterwards. In fact, many offenders abandon their 
previously held rationalization after the act, finding that the more they engaged in the fraud, 
the easier the fraud becomes and the less necessary it becomes to provide a reason for doing 
so. Wells (1997) later cited this phenomenon as a hallmark of occupational fraud, noting that 
once an offender crosses the line, “the illegal acts become more or less continuous” (p. 17).  
Sutherland’s and Cressey’s seminal efforts in occupational fraud research provide the 
foundation for what is known regarding the causal factors of fraud. Although Cressey himself 
did not refer to his hypothesis as the Fraud Triangle, his findings have become ingrained in 
both academia and the private sector. The auditing profession formally adopted the concept, 
which appears in the Statement of Auditing Standards (SAS) 99: Consideration of Fraud in a 
Financial Statement Audit, as follows:  
Three conditions generally are present when fraud occurs. First, management 
or other employees have an incentive or are under pressure, which provides a 
reason to commit fraud. Second, circumstances exist—for example, the 
absence of controls, ineffective controls, or the ability of management to 
override controls—that provide an opportunity for a fraud to be perpetrated. 
Third, those involved are able to rationalize committing a fraudulent act. 
Some individuals possess an attitude, character, or set of ethical values that 
allow them to knowingly and intentionally commit a dishonest act. However, 
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even otherwise honest individuals can commit fraud in an environment that 
imposes sufficient pressure on them. The greater the incentive or pressure, the 
more likely an individual will be able to rationalize the acceptability of 
committing fraud. (American Institute of CPAs, 2011, p. 170)  
Cressey’s contribution to the study of fraud through the formulation of the Fraud 
Triangle, with its straightforward and easily understandable explanation of why fraud occurs 
and how good people make bad decisions, is virtually unmatched. Since its introduction more 
than 60 years ago, it has undergone modifications and expansions as researchers have 
identified weaknesses and conducted additional studies. Subsequent research findings have 
incrementally increased the collective knowledge regarding the perpetration of fraud.  
C. WOLFE AND HERMANSON’S FRAUD DIAMOND 
One later development was the inclusion of a fourth element, converting the Fraud 
Triangle into the Fraud Diamond (see Figure 2). In addition to incentive, opportunity, and 
rationalization, David T. Wolfe and Dana R. Hermanson, a CPA and professor of accounting, 
respectively, added a fourth consideration: an individual’s capability. Wolfe and Hermanson 
(2004) believed that an individual’s personal traits and abilities, in addition to the other three 
factors, play a significant role in whether fraud occurs.  
 
 
Figure 2.   Fraud Diamond 
(Wolfe & Hermanson, 2004, p. 38) 
Based on their extensive experience investigating fraud, Wolfe and Hermanson 
(2004) identified several essential personality traits regarding fraud commission, usually 
evident in fraud schemes that involve large sums of money or that take place over a 
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prolonged period. The following are what Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) referred to as the 




 coercion skills, 
 effective lying, and 
 immunity to stress. 
Clearly, not all these attributes are inherently bad. Being intelligent, confident, and 
persuasive are the characteristics that most likely contributed to the individual’s success in 
gaining a position of trust at the organization in the first place. It is when the individual 
decides to utilize these attributes against the company, being at the same time armed with the 
other capabilities, including the ability to lie effectively and deal with the stress of 
committing the fraud, that they become extremely dangerous and detrimental to the 
organization. Recently discovered fraud schemes highlight perpetrators with the capabilities 
Wolfe and Hermanson described; Bernie Madoff serves as an excellent example. Wolfe and 
Hermanson (2004) contended that “today’s largest frauds are committed by intelligent, 
experienced, creative people, with a solid grasp of company controls and vulnerabilities” 
(p. 40). 
While acknowledging overlap in the four areas (e.g., position as a capability also 
serves as opportunity), Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) contended that an individual’s 
capabilities should be evaluated as a separate element in an assessment of fraud risk. 
Additionally, they advised that assessing the capabilities of employees, particularly senior 
management, is critical and should not be a one-time effort. People can acquire professional 
capabilities and hone skills over time. Furthermore, internal processes and technologies are 
constantly changing, providing new opportunities for someone not previously recognized as a 
possessing the requisite characteristics to exploit. Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) provided 
specific recommendations for dealing with personal capability when assessing fraud risk: 
performing routine background checks; spending time with the person, both at and outside of 
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the workplace; and paying attention to the little things, like someone who consistently takes 
shortcuts or cheats at sports (p. 39).  
It is the Fraud Diamond’s inclusion of the personal characteristics that separates it 
from the Fraud Triangle, and its major contribution to the occupational fraud canon is its 
view of fraud opportunity that goes beyond purely environmental and situational dynamics. It 
clearly owes its origins to Cressey’s Fraud Triangle but is arguably a better explanatory 
model for certain types of fraud, such as financial statement fraud versus corruption or 
employee asset misappropriation. Another benefit associated with the Fraud Diamond is that 
capability is a more observable attribute than rationalization or pressure, which are attributes 
that an individual can keep private. In this manner, the Fraud Diamond enhances the Fraud 
Triangle by addressing a weakness of its predecessor. Although the Fraud Triangle is a 
theoretically sound model, brilliant in its simplicity, it is, by itself, an inadequate mechanism 
for deterring, preventing, and detecting fraud because two of its three elements (pressure and 
rationalization) are hidden.  
D. ALBRECHT’S FRAUD SCALE 
Another pioneer researcher in the field of occupational fraud was Steve Albrecht, 
who, along with colleagues Keith Howe and Marshall Romney, studied corporate fraud 
through surveying internal auditors of companies that had been victims of fraud. Their work 
culminated in the publication of Deterring Fraud: The Internal Auditor’s Perspective (1984). 
In one facet of the study, Albrecht, Howe, and Romney (1984) focused on the motivations of 
the fraud perpetrators; they provided the auditors with a list of 25 motivating factors to 
identify those most commonly dealt with. The following 10 are the most frequently cited 
factors:  
 the condition of living beyond one’s means,  
 an overwhelming desire for personal gain,  
 a high personal debt,  
 a close association with customers,  
 the perception that pay was incommensurate with duties,  
 a “wheeler–dealer” attitude,  
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 the condition of feeling challenged to beat the system,  
 excessive gambling habits,  
 undue family or peer pressure, and 
 no recognition for job performance. (Albrecht et al., 1984, p. 48) 
Although many of these duplicated Cressey’s findings with regard to the non-
shareable financial pressures, Albrecht et al. (1984) highlighted some interesting associations 
between the offenders and the characteristics of the fraud they committed. They observed 
that perpetrators of large frauds were more likely to use the funds to buy expensive houses 
and automobiles than perpetrators of small frauds. Another interesting finding was that those 
motivated by beating the system committed larger frauds. 
In addition to identifying personal characteristics, Albrecht et al. (1984) also noted 
environmental conditions. I provide a complete list of both, referred to as Red Flags, in 
Appendix B. Albrecht et al. (1984) used the same methodology to identify the most prevalent 
environmental factors: 
 placing too much trust in key employees, 
 lacking proper procedures for authorization of transactions, 
 inadequately disclosing personal investments and incomes, 
 not separating authorization of transactions from the custody of related 
assets, 
 lacking independent checks on performance, 
 giving inadequate attention to details, 
 not separating custody of assets from the accounting for those assets, 
 not separating duties between accounting functions, 
 lacking clear lines of authority and responsibility, and 
 internal auditors not frequently reviewing the department. 
These environmental conditions provide opportunity. Thus, in identifying personal 
characteristics, Albrecht et al. (1984) found the source of pressure in the environmental 
conditions and opportunity, as did Cressey. Similarly, Albrecht et al. (1984) concluded that 
there are three elements involved in occupational fraud:  
a situational pressure (a non-shareable financial pressure), a perceived 
opportunity to commit and conceal the dishonest act (a way to secretly resolve 
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the dishonest act or the lack of deterrence by management), and some way to 
rationalize (verbalize) the act as either being inconsistent with one’s personal 
level of integrity or justifiable. (p. 5)  
While incorporating pressure (although encompassing a wider range of what qualifies 
as a pressure) and opportunity, Albrecht et al. (1984) substituted personal integrity for 
rationalization. A benefit associated with the inclusion of integrity is that it can be a more 
easily observed feature than rationalization. This feature provides the same benefit that the 
capabilities element of the Fraud Diamond provides; and although an individual’s integrity 
certainly impacts his or her process of rationalization, rationalization is an internal process, 
whereas integrity has observable outputs. An individual’s commitment to ethical decision-
making can be judged by observing both a person’s decisions and his or her decision-making 
process (Dominey, Fleming, Kranacher, & Riley, 2010).  
Providing a model to explain the concept, Albrecht et al. (1984) introduced the Fraud 
Scale, as seen in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3.   Fraud Scale 
(Albrecht et al., 1984, p. 6) 
The Fraud Scale illustrates how the interaction of the three criteria (pressure, 
opportunity, and integrity) determine the degree of fraud risk. If everything is balanced, then 
the fraud risk is neutral; but when personal integrity is low and situational pressures and 
perceived opportunities are high, fraud is more likely to occur. The Fraud Scale, like the 
Fraud Diamond, supports the Fraud Triangle and attempts to enhance it. While the Fraud 
Diamond amends the opportunity component of the Triangle, the Fraud Scale amends the 
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rationalization component. Both models are therefore considered model extensions of the 
Fraud Triangle. 
E. HOLLINGER AND CLARK 
While Albrecht et al. (1984) surveyed auditors, Hollinger and Clark (1983) conducted 
a survey of 10,000 workers in the retail, hospital, and manufacturing sectors as part of their 
research regarding employee deviance, which the Department of Justice funded. 
Investigating the validity of multiple hypotheses, they concluded that employees steal 
primarily because of workplace conditions. Job dissatisfaction is the primary cause of 
employee theft. Although not necessarily a non-shareable financial problem, Cressey did 
acknowledge employee dissatisfaction in the employer–employee relations as a problem in 
the pressure construct of the Fraud Triangle. 
In addition to the relationship between job dissatisfaction and theft, Hollinger and 
Clark (1983) looked for correlations between other various attributes, including position and 
organizational controls. While confirming a direct relationship between an employee’s 
position and the level of the theft, they noted that because dissatisfaction was the primary 
motivator, the employee’s position only affected the method and amount of the theft after a 
decision to commit the crime had already been made.  
Hollinger and Clark (1983) recommended that management pay attention to four 
aspects of policy development: (1) a clear understanding regarding theft behavior, (2) 
continuous dissemination of positive information reflective of the company’s policies, (3) 
enforcement of sanctions, and (4) publicizing the sanctions. Hollinger and Clark (1983) 
concluded that the most important policy implication 
is that theft and workplace deviance are in large part a reflection of how 
management at all levels of the organization is perceived by the employee. 
Specifically, if the employee is permitted to conclude that his or her 
contribution to the workplace is not appreciated or that the organization does 
not seem to care about the theft of its property, we expect to find greater 
involvement. In conclusion, a lowered prevalence of employee theft may be 
one valuable consequence of a management team that is responsive to the 
current perceptions and attitudes of its workforce. (p. 146) 
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Although focused on employee theft, their conclusions are applicable to other forms 
of occupational fraud, including corruption. Although Hollinger and Clark did not create a 
new fraud model, and although they did not attempt to modify the Fraud Triangle model, 
their work regarding the employee theft motivation significantly impacted the field of 
occupational fraud. Most important, their research findings and recommendations impacted 
theories and practices regarding the best way for organizations to address employee 
deviance. 
F. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, I provided an overview of the evolution of occupational fraud theory 
and introduced the field’s conceptual models, including the benchmark model, the Fraud 
Triangle, and subsequent model extensions. I presented Sutherland’s study of white-collar 
criminals and Cressey’s study of trust violators as seminal works in the field now known as 
occupational fraud. The Fraud Triangle represents a groundbreaking model in understanding 
how fraud occurs. Since its introduction more than 60 years ago, it has undergone revisions 
and expansions, including the insights provided by the Fraud Diamond and the Fraud Scale; 
nevertheless, the Fraud Triangle remains the standard framework for explaining the 
necessary conditions under which fraud occurs. Having established the critical tenets of 
occupational fraud theory, in which I have included a sufficient explanation of the fraud 
models, in the next chapter I operationalize the theory by applying the Fraud Triangle Model 
to the contracting environment and instances of Army CCO corruption in OIF and OEF.  
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE CONTRACTING ENVIRONMENT 
UTILIZING OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD THEORY 
A. BACKGROUND 
In this chapter, I provide a brief overview of contingency contracting and Army CCO 
fraud in OIF and OEF, then address elements of the DoD’s contracting environment prior to 
these contingency operations that subsequently contributed to the Army’s fraud problems in 
theater. Next, I address the elements that created or stressed weaknesses in the OIF and OEF 
contingency contracting operation that contracting officers themselves exploited 
purposefully, or inadvertently allowed other contracting personnel the opportunity to do so. 
For both periods, prior to and during OIF and OEF, I approach the elements utilizing the 
construct of the Fraud Triangle model by examining how they could affect the pressures, 
opportunities, and rationalizations Army CCOs experience that ultimately could lead to a 
decision to commit fraud.  
1.  Contingency Contracting 
A contingency is an event that requires the deployment of military forces in response 
to natural disasters, terrorist or subversive activities, collapse of law and order, political 
instability, or other military operations (Headquarters, Department of the Army [HQDA], 
1999, p. 1-2). In accordance with 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(13), a declared contingency operation 
of the Department of Defense (DoD) may be 
 Designated by the Secretary of Defense when members of the armed 
forces become involved in military actions against an enemy of the United 
States, and/or 
 Declared by the President or the Congress when members of the 
uniformed forces are called to active duty (a reserve component 
mobilization) under Title 10 U.S.C., or any provision of law during a 
declared war or national emergency. (Director, Defense Procurement and 
Acquisition Policy [DPAP], 2010, p. 78) 
Joint Publication 4-10, Operational Contract Support, defines contingency 
contracting as “the process of obtaining goods, services, and construction from commercial 
sources via contracting means in support of contingency operations” (Chairman of the Joint 
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Chiefs of Staff [CJCS], 2008, p. I-2). The Defense Contingency Contracting Handbook 
defines contingency contracting as “direct contracting support to tactical and operational 
forces engaged in the full spectrum of armed conflict and noncombat contingency operations, 
both domestic and overseas” (Director, DPAP, 2010, p. 77). In 2010, the Army conducted 
108 contingency contracting missions in 39 countries, including combat support in OIF and 
OEF, as well as humanitarian relief in Haiti and Pakistan (Phillips, 2011). 
Contingency contracting is inherently complex because it takes place in an 
environment that is often hostile. CCOs face challenges associated with not only their 
physical security, but also a fragile business and financial environment. All of these problems 
were, and to some extent still are, present in the contingency contracting environments of 
Iraq and Afghanistan. In the fall of 2001, as operations got underway in Afghanistan, the 
deploying contracting personnel faced a variety of issues: a lack of a contracting 
organizational structure, inefficient resource allocation, and minimal training to the incoming 
CCOs (D’Angelo, Houglan, & Ruckwardt, 2008). Contracting organization, staffing, and 
coordination were also problems in Iraq. The Iraq Program Management Office was the first 
contracting agency established in theater in January 2003 to provide support for both 
reconstruction and coalition forces as early as January 2003. Within months, there were 
numerous contracting agencies operating in the country, each functionally independent of 
one another with little coordination taking place. The various contracting agencies included 
the following: 
the Coalition Joint Task Force, 24 military contracting personnel supporting 
120,000 U.S. forces; the CPA’s Project and Contracting Office, focusing on 
Iraq’s reconstruction contracting effort; the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 
working construction and civil engineering projects; the Defense Contract 
Management Agency, coordinating Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 
support; and Special Operations contracting teams, working various missions 
throughout the country. (Houglan, 2006, p. 23)  
After almost two years of enduring disjointed, ad-hoc contracting processes in 
theater, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) created the Joint Contracting Command–Iraq 
(JCC–I)5 in November 2004 to alleviate the absence of any central coordinating authority 
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managing contracting (Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction [SIGIR], 2006). In 
July 2005, CENTCOM ordered contracting in Afghanistan to fall under JCC–I contracting 
authority, with the organization renamed Joint Contracting Command–Iraq/Afghanistan 
(JCC–I/A, 2009; Houglan, 2006). While JCC–I/A made progress addressing some of the 
internal and structural contracting problems, the issue of corruption, both internal and 
external to the contracting organization, remains.  
2.  Army CCO Corruption in OIF and OEF 
From Department of Justice conviction information available in SIGIR reports, I was 
able to compile the following data regarding Army CCO prosecutions for fraud in OIF and 
OEF, presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1.   Army CCO Convictions 
(SIGIR, 2011, pp. 142–146) 










Money Laundering KUWAIT 3/1/2011 Pending 2,800,000.00$    
SANCHEZ, RODERICK MAJ Bribery KUWAIT 10/27/2010 60 months 216,000.00$        
SUBLETT, CHARLES MAJ False statements IRAQ 7/7/2010 21 months  122,000.00$        
RUSSELL, THERESA SSG Money laundering IRAQ 1/28/2010 5 yrs Probation 30,000.00$          
MURRAY, CHRISTOPHER MAJ
Bribery, False 
statements KUWAIT 1/8/2009 57 months 245,000.00$        
BAKER, THERESA MAJ Bribery, conspiracy IRAQ 12/22/2008 70 months 400,000.00$        
MOMON, JAMES MAJ Bribery, conspiracy KUWAIT 8/13/2008 Pending 5,800,000.00$    
COCKERHAM, JOHN MAJ
Bribery, Conspiracy, 
Money Laundering KUWAIT 6/24/2008 210 months 9,600,000.00$    
RIVARD, JOHN MAJ
Bribery, Conspiracy 
Money laundering IRAQ 7/23/2007 120 months 220,000.00$          
From court records and public accounts, these CCOs appear to fit the occupational 
fraud profile Cressey (1953) described. Prior to the commission of the crimes that led to their 
convictions, these CCOs were military members in good standing, respected by seniors and 
subordinates alike. For instance, during his career, Major Sanchez “received 28 medals, 
including a Bronze Star, and was named Army Contracting Officer of the Year in 2004” 
(Ensslin, 2011). Major Pressley’s leadership in Kuwait gave him an excellent Officer 
Evaluation Report (OER), rating him in the top 10% of all majors and recommending him for 
early promotion and future battalion command based on “his stalwart belief in the Army 
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values” (United States v. Pressley, 2011, p. A-5). During the sentencing hearing for Major 
Cockerham, the judge told him the following: 
Mr. Cockerham, let me say that there is so much about your life that’s been 
good. You’ve really brought yourself up by your shoestrings, by your boot 
straps, and you had an impressive career in the Army. You’ve fought for a 
good education. You’ve been a good family man, and after this has happened 
you have worked very hard to make amends, to make it up, to work with the 
Government. All those things I understand. And it makes this case all the 
more tragic, that somebody whose record indicates such goodness could have 
done something that was so wrong. (United States v. Cockerham, 2009, pp. 
74–75) 
These CCO profiles support the tenet that virtually anyone may commit fraud under a 
certain set of circumstances and that most fraudsters have “profiles that look exactly like 
their honest counterpart’s profiles” (Albrecht, Wernz, & Williams, 1995, p. 7). The 
conditions enabling all three legs of the Fraud Triangle to exist and fraud to manifest itself 
through the actions of these CCOs were established through a combination of systemic 
contracting environment issues and elements attributable to virtually any contingency 
contracting operation, all of which culminated in a “perfect storm” (Gansler et al., 2007, 
p. 17) for the Army and its contracting community.  
3.  The DoD’s Contract Management Designation as High-Risk 
Problems associated with the DoD’s procurement and related functions are not unique 
to contingency operations. The DoD faced systemic problems in the field of contracting, as 
well as in the interrelated fields of financial and property management, that predated the 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (GAO, 2011b). Over a two-decade period, the GAO and 
other oversight agencies documented shortcomings spanning the entire procurement 
continuum from requirements identification, contracting, payment and funds control, and 
equipment receipt and property accountability.  
The GAO began formally reporting on areas classified as high-risk to reduce or 
eliminate vulnerabilities in government operations that were susceptible to fraud, waste, and 
abuse or mismanagement. Table 2 shows that the GAO has identified these DoD areas as 
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Table 2.   Year Areas Were Designated High-Risk 
Area Year designated high-risk 
DoD Contract Management 1992 
DoD Financial Management 1995 
DoD Supply Chain Management 1990 
Note. I took the information in this table from a lengthier table found in the GAO’s 2011 High-Risk 
Series (GAO, 2011b, p. 173). 
To be considered high-risk, the GAO evaluates government programs and functions 
to consider whether the risk involved qualifies, among other criteria, as an  
inherent problem, such as may arise when the nature of a program creates 
susceptibility to fraud, waste, and abuse … and could result in significantly impaired 
service, program failure, injury or loss of life, or significantly reduced economy 
efficiency or effectiveness … and exposure to loss in monetary or other quantitative 
terms. (GAO, 2011b, p. 174)  
Published annually, the high-risk list identifies risk elements and provides 
recommendations for improvement; removal from the report is the ultimate goal. As the 
largest buyer of goods and services in the world (Department of Defense, Inspector General 
[DoDIG], 2010), the federal government has an obvious stake in ensuring that its 
procurement, payment, and accountability processes are operating effectively, thereby 
providing maximum cost savings. The magnitude and complexity of these functions, 
however, provide substantial challenges, as supported by sustained appearances on the High-
Risk report for almost two decades. 
The GAO uses contract management as an umbrella term to cover various facets of 
federal contracting, both pre- and post-award, as distinguished from the more narrowly 
construed definition commonly applied in the contracting community that associates contract 
management with actions occurring after a contract award, also referred to as contract 
administration. While the areas that the GAO chooses to highlight as high-risk in the area of 
contract management vary from year to year, several are recurring: the size and capabilities 
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of the acquisition workforce, the proper utilization of contract vehicles, and adequate 
contractor oversight (GAO, 2011b).  
The challenges involved in the effective management of contract management, 
financial management, and property management are not only present in the contingency 
environment but are heightened. The DoDIG reports that the GAO and other DoD oversight 
groups issued 302 unclassified reports and testimonies highlighting issues regarding these 
functions in support of OEF and OIF (DoDIG, 2008a, p. 3). Table 3 shows the number of 
reports and recommendations compiled by the DoDIG. 
Table 3.   OEF and OIF Related Reports and Testimonies (FY2003–2007) 
(DoDIG, 2008a, p. 3) 
Area 
Number of Reports & 
Testimonies 
Recommendations 
Contract Management 103 302 
Logistics 119 332 
Financial Management 133 264 
Other 73 119 
Note. The total will exceed 302 because reports and testimonies cover multiple functional areas. 
In addition to inheriting the problems present in traditional operational contracting, 
contingency contracting provides unique challenges, such as the accountability of contractor 
personnel in theater, increased requirement complexity including security and reconstruction 
operations, and the training of a vast number of non-acquisition personnel to perform 
oversight functions. These issues are compounded by the lack of reliable information 
technology and communication systems in a highly distributed and hostile environment, as 
well as a rapid contracting personnel turnover and operational tempo. In Section C of this 
chapter, I discuss how these and other environmental elements can impact the CCO’s 
decision to commit fraud. 
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B. PROBLEMATIC DOD PROCUREMENT TRENDS PRIOR TO OIF/OEF   
In the years prior to the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, several trends emerged 
that compromised the DoD’s ability to properly manage the acquisition of goods and services 
and, in turn, directly and indirectly impacted the likelihood of fraud. Thus, many of the 
challenges encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan can be linked to pre-existing conditions that 
the DoD failed to manage effectively. First was the increasing contract workload, both in 
terms of number of contract actions and dollars, necessitated by an increasing reliance on 
contractors to perform services previously done by both government, civilian, and military 
personnel. Second was the concurrent decrease in the number of contracting personnel to 
handle the workload. Third was the increasing complexity of contract actions and requisite 
administration. Fourth was the failure to ensure that adequate audit and investigative assets 
kept pace with the value of DoD contracts. Finally, several institutional aspects, particularly 
characteristic of the Army, negatively affected the organization’s ability to recognize and 
address the previous issues. 
1.  Increasing Reliance on Contractors 
Although the military has always, to some extent, augmented organic assets with 
contracted support, several factors culminated to radically alter the scale of contractor 
support post–Cold War: a reduction in the overall size of the military along with the 
implementation of the all-volunteer force, an increase in the number of operations, and the 
adoption of sophisticated weapons systems (GAO, 2008).  
The federal government, particularly the DoD, recognizes numerous benefits of 
outsourcing. The use of contractors provides the military with flexibility, surge capacity, and 
access to a pool of talent in specialized fields otherwise unobtainable. Although some debate 
the cost benefits, they acknowledge the utility of contractors. However, the positives are 
offset by risks that must be managed to ensure proper oversight, the avoidance of contractor 
performance of inherently governmental functions, and what is now being identified as an 
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Although the questions of contractor support appropriateness and over-reliance are 
outside the scope of this report, what is clear by reviewing the data is that DoD reliance on 
contractors prior to OIF/OEF had been steadily increasing over time, reaching a one-to-one 
uniformed personnel-to-contractor ratio in the Balkans. Figure 4 shows the increasing 
complexity of contracted services over time and the ratio of contractors to military personnel 
during each conflict.  
 
Figure 4.   Evolution of Contracted Support in U.S. Military Operations 
(Thibault et al., 2009, p. 21) 
Failing to keep pace was the DoD’s doctrine to incorporate contractor support, as well 
as the size and capability of its acquisition workforce required to effectively manage 
contracts. Additionally, the growing reliance on contractors to perform service requirements 
necessitated increased auditing and investigative assets, which did not materialize.  
The increasing reliance on contractors led to a vast growth in the number of contract 
actions. The sheer quantity and dollar volume provides greater opportunity for kickbacks, 
bribery, and other procurement crimes. When increased reliance on contracted support 
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carries over to a contingency environment, “the opportunity and motive exist to illegally and 
opportunistically make a fortune in a short period of time” (Ethridge et al., 2007, p. 37). 
2.  Insufficient Number of Trained Acquisition Personnel  
The acquisition workforce shrinkage occurred in part due to the post–Cold War 
drawdown, as well as a general negative perception resulting from high-profile scandals 
during the Reagan era, leading to a consensus that the DoD acquisition workforce 
“underperformed and was too large” (Gates, 2009, p. 7). Additionally, a major acquisition 
reform movement during the 1990s encouraged the belief that the increased use of 
technology and more efficient contracting vehicles, including the use of the purchase card, 
could translate to a smaller acquisition workforce (SIGIR, 2006).  
Of particular relevance was the GS-1102, the civilian contracting series, which since 
1987 has undergone a 15% reduction in personnel at the same time that contract actions 
started to increase sharply. Figure 5 shows the substantial reduction that began in the early 
1990s.  
  
Figure 5.   DoD Acquisition Workforce Trends 
(Defense Acquisition University, 2007, pp. 3–8) 
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Because of their shrinking numbers and the concurrent increase in contract actions, 
the contracting personnel had to assume additional responsibilities and deal with greater 
expectations regarding required skills to perform their job, as described in a GAO report: 
Over the last decade, the federal acquisition workforce has had to adapt to 
changes in staffing levels, workloads, and the need for new skill sets. 
Procurement reforms have placed unprecedented demands on the acquisition 
workforce. For example, contracting specialists are required to have a greater 
knowledge of market conditions, industry trends, and the technical details of 
the commodities and services they procure. (GAO, 2003, p. 20) 
Exacerbating the problem, the remaining acquisition personnel had to deal with 
budgetary cuts to training programs, which made it more difficult for them “to adapt to the 
increasingly complex and demanding environment in which they were called upon to 
function” (Acquisition Advisory Panel, 2007, p. 336). These factors influence potential 
work-related pressures that could influence an individual to commit fraud. Although other 
pressures include those of a financial nature (e.g., living beyond one’s means, high personal 
debt) or vices (e.g., gambling or drugs), work-related pressures include factors such as 
“getting little recognition for job performance, having a feeling of job dissatisfaction, … and 
feeling underpaid” (Albrecht et al., 1995, p. 24). 
3.  Increasing Complexity of Contract Actions 
The capability gap of the federal contracting workforce was further widened by the 
increasing complexity of contract actions that resulted from the tremendous expansion of 
service contracts, as shown in Table 4, which are more time-intensive and require significant 
surveillance resources, as well as the move towards performance-based acquisition and the 
best-value evaluation approach, which require greater skill and sophistication to execute in 
comparison to a lowest-price award basis.  
Table 4.   Changes in the DoD’s Use of Service Contracts (FY 1996–2005) 









Fiscal Year 2005 
Percentage 
change,  
Fiscal Years 1996 
to 2005 1996 2005 
Professional, admin & mgmt $10.8 $28.3 20.0 161 
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Construction of facilities 7.3 11.7 8.3 62 
Maintenance & repair 6.6 11.4 8.1 74 
Information technology 4.9 10.3 7.3 110 
Medical services 1.6 8.0 5.6 412 
Transportation, travel 2.4 6.2 4.4 154 
Housekeeping services 2.4 4.8 3.4 98 
All other services, excl 
R&D 
22.7 23.6 16.7 4 
Research & Development 23.7 37.0 26.2 56 
Total, all service contracts $82.3 $141.2 100.0 72 
Note. FY 2005 dollars in billions. 
 
Even measures implemented to streamline the government contracting process often 
had the opposite effect when fully realized. Although the institution of simplified acquisition 
procedures was intended to “promote efficiency and economy in contracting; and avoid 
unnecessary burdens for agencies and contractors” (Federal Acquisition Regulation [FAR], 
2005, subpart 13.002), in some instances the unintended consequence was an increase in 
workload, that is, the implementation and oversight of the Government Purchase Card 
program.  
The increased use of contractors to provide services continues in OIF and OEF, where 
66% of overall contract spending is for services (Thibault et al., 2011b, p. 7). The greater 
technical knowledge required to award and administer contracts for services is part of the 
prerequisite in the opportunity leg of the Fraud Triangle. Although CCOs are sufficiently 
trained to carry out their duties in their positions of trust, they are simultaneously receiving 
the training they need to violate those positions of trust. Additionally, because technical 
certification guidelines in contracting require a baccalaureate degree and at least 24 semester 
hours in areas encompassing accounting, law, business, finance, contracts, purchasing, and 
economics, the CCO is postured to take advantage of this knowledge to circumvent the 
system. The conspiracy scheme in Kuwait is an example of CCOs utilizing a sophisticated 
system to defraud the government: Pressley “established three shell companies to launder 
money, produced false documents to camouflage money transfers, and enlisted family 
member to serve as nominal owner of one of the shell companies” and “engaged in 
‘layering,’ i.e., two or more wire transfers involving criminally derived funds that were 
intended to appear legitimate” (United States v. Pressley, 2011, p. 11). 
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4.  Inadequate Audit and Investigative Assets 
DoD auditors and investigators faced the same predicament as contracting 
professionals, with capabilities and resources failing to keep pace with the unprecedented 
growth in the number and value of contract actions. The ratio of DoDIG auditors to the 
Defense budget had declined significantly so that by 2007, there was one DoDIG auditor for 
each $657 million of the Defense budget. The DoDIG reported that contracting fraud 
investigation is one area of many that has “dropped in priority” and “largely been neglected” 
(DoDIG, 2008b, p. 21). This shift is due in part to the new focus on intelligence and 
terrorism and a corresponding shift in resources, which led the DoDIG to conclude that its 
“coverage of high risk area and Defense priorities is weakened and will continue to weaken 
by insufficient personnel to accomplish our statutory duties” (DoDIG, 2008b, p. 11).  
This diminished capability negatively affected the DoD’s ability to prevent and detect 
fraud, as the lack of adequate audit and investigative assets provide a fraudster both 
opportunity and easier rationalization to commit a crime.  
5.  Institutional Challenges Specific to the Army 
While the DoD as a whole struggled with the challenges associated with the evolving 
procurement environment, the Army as an institution had cultural characteristics that 
contributed to contract support problems in OIF/OEF. One was the existence of a warfighter-
centric culture that had little regard for its contracting workforce and the value it provided, 
and which, in turn, prevented a meaningful acknowledgment of the requirement to 
institutionalize operational contract support.  
A persistent challenge faced by the Army, that in part explains the historical 
mismanagement of its acquisition workforce, is a culture that fundamentally lacks an 
understanding of the tremendous value its procurement community provides, as well as the 
inherent complexity involved in contracting for goods and services. Dr. Jacques Gansler, 
who served as Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics from 
1997 to 2001, explained the Army culture. 
Army culture is focused on warfighting and therefore neither recognizes the critical 
and complex nature of contracting nor rewards people in the contracting community. 
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Contracting personnel have been characterized incorrectly as “shoppers” by some both inside 
and outside of the Army (and, consequently, they have been reduced in both quantity and 
stature), as opposed to being viewed as true professionals (Gansler et al., 2007, p. 29). Its 
sister Services also struggled to adapt, but the Army was notably further behind in several 
key areas, according to a Center for Naval Analysis report issued in 2001 (as cited in Gansler 
et al., 2007). The result was an Army contracting workforce that was “understaffed, 
overworked, under-trained, under-supported, and … most importantly, under-valued” 
(Gansler et al., 2007, p. 3). The Army failed to recognize the importance of CCOs and their 
contributions to the contingency mission as reflected in their personnel numbers and 
projected career path. When operations in Iraq and Afghanistan commenced, military 
personnel made up only 3% of the Army’s contracting workforce, and only half had the 
requisite certification for their current positions (Gansler et al., 2007, p. 24). Additionally, the 
Army offered a stunted career path in contracting by preventing officers from beginning their 
contracting careers earlier than eight years after commissioning and with no contracting 
general officer positions, limiting upward career mobility and longevity. 
Although the inability to receive a promotion to general officer may not have 
motivated any CCO to commit fraud, these policies did not contribute to an overall positive 
work environment. Research indicates that having positive personnel and operating policies 
are important factors in contributing to high- or low-fraud environments (Albrecht, Albrecht, 
& Albrecht, 2006). As previously noted, limited promotion opportunities, job dissatisfaction, 
and lack of recognition for job performance can be factors in motivating fraud. 
C.  CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING 
ENVIRONMENT IN OIF/OEF CONDUCIVE TO FRAUD 
Although integrity can be an issue regardless of the contracting environment, there 
are elements associated with contingency contracting that make it uniquely susceptible to 
fraud, either by introducing unconventional components into the contracting equation or by 
exacerbating existing systemic weaknesses. After conducting a comprehensive review of 
reports documenting procurement fraud in OIF and OEF, I compiled the salient factors and 
categorized them into the following topic areas: Environment, Procedures, Personnel, and 
Control Mechanisms. I do mean to represent this categorization as an all-inclusive list, but 
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instead it reflects the most frequently cited factors by investigators that make contingency 
contracting operations highly conducive to fraud. These factors can clearly overlap, be 
interrelated, or work in concert, and not all characteristics will be present in every 
contingency, as they are dependent on the mission, location, duration, and other operational 
dynamics. Additionally, some characteristics of a contingency contracting environment may 
contribute to its overall complexity or otherwise distinguish it from a non-emergency 
situation but not necessarily affect the likelihood of fraud.  
1.  Environment Issues 
a. Operational Tempo 
Operational tempo—characterized by a high workload ratio or volume, and an 
extremely demanding customer base with urgent life, health, and safety requirements—can 
singularly or collectively influence a CCO to take a variety of shortcuts. The shortcuts can, in 
turn, increase the government’s risk and create vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, or abuse. A 
run-away workload also means less oversight by senior contracting personnel and chiefs, 
which enables opportunities for fraud by other CCOs and contractors. Lieutenant General N. 
Ross Thompson III, the Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for 
Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, in his testimony before Congress, noted that the 
fraud that occurred in OIF and OEF was in large part due to “the lack of oversight and being 
overworked, a small office with just too many contracts to manage, too many contracts to 
cut” (Department of Defense Appropriations, 2009, p. 24). Figure 6 depicts the enormous 
increase in contract obligations in OIF and OEF. 
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Figure 6.   Cumulative Obligations on Contracts and Grants (in $ Billions) Performed 
in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar 
(Thibault et al., 2011a, p. 6) 
The DoD and the Army have had significant challenges resourcing contracting 
personnel to keep pace with the workload in OIF and OEF. As late as 2010, despite the 
enormous amount of attention contingency contracting received from Congress and DoD 
leadership, CCO billets in JCC–I/A had a fill rate of only 88% (Department of Defense 
Contingency Contracting Initiatives, 2010, p. 5).  
b. Pressure to Award Procurements Faster 
Efforts to meet urgent needs in a combat or other high-threat environment can 
lead to “less than prudent contracting practices” (DoDIG, 2010, p. 1), such as the use of 
unclear or out-of-scope requirements, the inappropriate use of inter-agency contract vehicles 
or contract type (time and materials, cost-reimbursement), or lack of file documentation. 
These practices can subsequently lead to undesirable outcomes, including higher costs, 
schedule delays or rework, and, ultimately, unmet requirements, which jeopardize the overall 
mission. The stress of operating in a contingency environment with constant pressure from 
customers for expedited contract awards can also negatively affect a CCO’s morale, in turn 
feeding general job dissatisfaction and feelings of not being appreciated. This mindset can 
provide the rationalization to commit fraud. 
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c. Cultural Norms Regarding Corruption  
“Most crimes uncovered by U.S. investigators in the two war zones include 
bribery, kickbacks and theft, inspired in part by the deep and pervasive cultures of corruption 
indigenous to the countries themselves” (Jelinek, 2011). The cultural norms of the host 
country in which a contingency operation takes place may influence a CCO to engage in 
corrupt activities if continually exposed to offers of gratuities or kickbacks, which from the 
offerer’s perspective may be considered legitimate or accepted business practices. Local 
contractors may not understand or may choose to ignore U.S. government procurement laws 
that govern improper business practices and, since corruption can be deeply embedded in the 
cultural psyche, it can be a difficult force to overcome. In fact, Stuart W. Bowen, SIGIR, 
referred to corruption as “the second insurgency” in Iraq (Assessing the State of Iraqi 
Corruption, 2007) and compared it to a cancer that had overtaken the country. Both Iraq and 
Afghanistan were countries in which government corruption was the norm prior to the arrival 
of U.S. forces. In fact, both countries still rank near the bottom of 178 countries rated on a 
scale on which zero is the most corrupt and ten is the least corrupt, as shown in Table 5.  
Table 5.   2010 Corruption Perceptions Index 
Rank Country Score 
1 Denmark 9.3 
1 New Zealand 9.3 
1 Singapore 9.3 
175 Iraq 1.5 
176 Afghanistan 1.4 
Note. I took the information in this table from a lengthier table found at the Transparency International 
website (Transparency International, 2011). 
 
Of course, CCOs operating in the U.S. (which ranks 22nd) are not immune 
from similar temptations. Hurricane Katrina is an example of a U.S. contingency that was in 
no way immune from fraud; the Department of Justice set up an entire task force to deal with 
Katrina fraud. However, during the course of executing contracts in countries where 
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corruption is a way of life, the CCO may have an easier time rationalizing complicit 
behavior. Several CCOs tried to defend their actions in court on the basis that bribery is 
common in the Middle East. Major Pressley claimed that the contractors who paid him bribes 
were “more than glad to do so” (United States v. Pressley, 2011, p. 17). Major Cockerham 
and his lawyer even attempted to provide a religious characterization of the bribes received 
as “blessings” from Muslim contractors. The courts rejected this argument. As Judge 
Ferguson explained in sentencing John Cockerham, 
You know, I don’t think it makes any difference what words you use, a bribe 
is a bribe and, of course. I mean we—we know we’re fighting two wars, we’re 
fighting a war in Afghanistan where you just have to read the papers to know 
that one of the great concerns in that war is the corruption of high level 
officials in Afghanistan and, you know, people just need to tell people, “No, 
that’s not the way we do business. We don’t take these kind of blessings.” We 
just don’t do that; this is the United States of America. (United States v. 
Cockerham, 2009, pp. 34–35) 
These instances show how cultural norms regarding corruption affect both the 
opportunity and rationalization sides of the Fraud Triangle. 
d. Less Sophisticated Local Business Practices/Contractors 
Contingency operations executed in foreign countries provide inherent 
challenges, such as language barriers and contractors unfamiliar with U.S. contracting 
procedures. In lesser-developed areas, the business environment may be extremely immature, 
causing the CCO to do business with contractors who are illiterate, or who are accustomed to 
completing transactions via verbal agreements. In such instances, it can be easier for a CCO 
to take advantage of a contractor seeking to do business with the U.S. government because of 
the contractor’s naiveté regarding the contracting process or their trust in the CCO as a 
representative of the U.S. government. A contractor may not be aware of the fact that they do 
not have to pay a fee to request a solicitation or submit an offer, or that bribes and kickbacks 
are illegal. A deputy contracting chief in Afghanistan astutely summarized the environmental 
factors at work in OEF: “Afghan business practices are challenged in several areas, such as 
ethics, technical capability, and links to criminal patronage networks” (Center, 2011, p. 109). 
Thus, the degree of the contracting environment’s maturity and the local contractor’s 
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familiarity with U.S. contracting procedures can impact a CCO’s opportunity to commit 
fraud by creating opportunities to take advantage of contractors and commit economic 
extortion,6 which the contractor may not even recognize as such. 
2.  Procedural 
a. Waived Contracting Officer Appointment Standards  
The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) waives 
the education, training, and certification requirements for contracting officer appointment if 
supporting a contingency contracting force (DFARS, 2010, subpart 201.603.2(2)(ii)). The 
regulation’s intent is to provide maximum flexibility by relaxing the prerequisites involved in 
obtaining a contracting warrant to meet the urgent need of a contingency operation. 
However, the flexibility must be tempered with the recognition that the requirements exist as 
safeguards to prevent inexperienced and potentially unqualified personnel from having 
authority that exceeds their capabilities. Injudicious application can provide an opportunity 
for personal enrichment through corrupt practices by an unscrupulous CCO. Unfortunately, 
even an ethical CCO or contracting chief, if lacking the necessary knowledge, skills, and 
abilities to carry out his or her duties, can enable fraud by other parties, including other 
CCOs taking advantage of a perceived weakness. As the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) publication Fraud Indicators points out, 
The manager, auditor, or investigator must know the industry, the system, or 
the field and must establish what are accepted practices. It is hard to spot an 
aberration when you don’t know the norm. It is difficult, if not almost 
impossible, to detect a well designed fraud if you do not know what you are 
looking for. (USAID, 2005, p. 2) 
Waived contracting officer appointment standards and less than judicious 
vetting of contracting authority increase the likelihood of unethical personnel placed into 
positions of authority and, presented with opportunities, taking advantage of their newfound 
trust. However, it also increases the likelihood of ethical, but untrained or unprepared, 
                                                 
6 Economic extortion is a form of corruption in which “an employee demands a payment from a vendor in order 
to make a decision in that vendor's favor” (Albrecht et al., 2006, p.529). 
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individuals assigned responsibilities that they are ill equipped to handle. In this regard, the 
waiver of standards affects the opportunity for personnel, CCOs included, to commit fraud. 
b. Cash-Based Business Practices 
In addition to the risks associated with the provision of procurement authority 
to inexperienced personnel in contingency operations, cash-based contractor payment 
procedures create risk through inherently weaker accountability protocols. In many 
operations, the austere environment does not lend itself to electronic commerce, specifically 
electronic fund transfer, whether resulting from a lack of infrastructure, a constrained 
information technology platform (lack of bandwidth, connectivity issues), or contractor 
distrust of public institutions. While standard operating procedures typically prevent a CCO 
from making payments to avoid a conflict of interest, other government personnel in close 
proximity such as field ordering officers/pay agents, project purchasing officers, and finance 
personnel have access. The influx of cash in close proximity to military personnel, many with 
little prior exposure to large sums of money, can present a strong enticement to commit 
fraud. Mr. Quinn, the Chief of Staff for Army Criminal Investigation Command noted, “It 
was just so much money, and a lot of it in cash, that bribery is the number one issue we have 
looked at” (Department of Defense Appropriations, 2009, p. 19).  
Audit trails for cash payments can be difficult to maintain, which reinforces 
the likelihood of fraud. The prosecuting attorney in the case against Major Cockerham 
observed that he was smart because he kept all the money in cash, noting, “It’s very hard for 
the Government to trace money in cash. There are no wire transfers, there’s no bank receipts, 
there’s no means by which to trace the flow of funds, absent ledgers that people make” 
(United States v. Cockerham, 2009, p. 40). The issues with utilizing cash are systemic. 
Numerous assessments from various agencies, including the GAO, the DoDIG, and the 
SIGIR, “reveal a lack of accountability for large sums of money spent for Iraq contracts” 
(Grasso, 2010, p. 12). As of June 13, 2011, $6.6 billion in cash was still unaccounted for, 
prompting the SIGIR to state that the missing money could be “the largest theft of funds in 
national history” (Richter, 2011).  
=
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 46 -=
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli 
c. Utilization of Manual Contracting Methods  
Similarly, manual contracting methods provide further opportunity to 
circumvent controls inherent in an automated procurement system. Procurement Desktop 
Defense (PD2), an application of the Standard Procurement System, is the standard 
automated contracting system in the DoD (Defense Business Systems Acquisition Executive 
[DBSAE], 2010). It prevents the accidental or purposeful duplication of procurement 
instrument identification numbers (i.e., contract numbers) and computational errors in 
contract amounts. PD2 also provides an electronic repository of contracts accessible to 
personnel with permissions, thereby providing transparency. Another benefit the system 
provides is the capability to run reports identifying the status of various contract actions 
enabling workload analysis, funding information, and critical tools for contract 
administration. Findings from an early SIGIR report, as shown in Table 6, highlight the 
problems associated with manual contracting methods. 
Table 6.   Deficiencies Identified by SIGIR During Contract Review, Iraq 2005 




The PCO did not effectively maintain contract files to ensure that contract 
execution was monitored for performance and payment. During our initial 
review, PCO personnel in three of four PCO regions could not locate contract 
files for 13 contracts, valued at $7,568,565. 
Contract 
Funding 
The PCO could not accurately identify the total value of contracts funded by 
the DFI. Our review showed that six contracts, valued at $25,418 were funded 
by U.S. Government appropriated funds but were erroneously presented as DFI 
liabilities in Comptroller/PCO summary records. 
Contract 
Numbering 
The PCO did not maintain adequate administrative control over contract 
numbering. Our review showed that the Comptroller/PCO listing indicated the 
PCO issued 34 contracts, valued at $54,343,349, but used only 14 different 
contract numbers. Contract values totaled $27,660,981 for contracts that used 
the same contract number two or more times. 
Contract 
Payments 
The PCO did not always properly review contract files prior to making contract 
payments to ensure that the correct amount was paid. Our review showed that 
one contract in the South–Central Region was overpaid by $40,000. 
Note. PCO is the Project and Contracting Office; DFI is the Development Fund for Iraq.  
 
As manual methods promote and enable file manipulation, as well as often 
lead to an irreversible lack of an audit trail, they create an opportunity-providing factor. No 
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accountability exists without documents and “without accountability, it is much easier to 
perpetrate a fraud and not get caught” (Albrecht et al., 1995, p. 35). 
3.  Personnel Issues 
a. Deployment May Exacerbate Personal and Financial Hardships 
A long-term deployment has the potential to cause or intensify existing 
personal and financial problems a CCO experiences. Multiple and/or lengthy deployments 
can trigger considerable stress and lead to low morale, making the CCO susceptible to the 
perceived benefits of fraudulent activity. Some Reserve and National Guard CCOs7 may 
incur a substantial decrease in salary resulting from activation; 28% of activated reservists 
experience a loss in earnings according to a 2005 RAND report, and DoD reports place the 
number as high as 51% (Klerman, Loughran, & Martin, 2005). This financial pressure, 
coupled with extended separation from family, can provide motivation to engage in corrupt 
activities. CCOs may rationalize their actions in the belief that the Army “owes” them, or 
they may feel compelled by financial hardships back home. A CCO may resent the Army, 
and the act of fraud represents an opportunity to “get even.” The demanding, and frequently 
dangerous, environment that a CCO is exposed to may further impair judgment and, in 
conjunction with other contingency unique factors, impact a CCO’s proclivity to engage in 
corrupt behavior. 
b. Insufficient Skills, Inadequate Staffing, and Rapid Personnel 
Turnover  
The SIGIR observed that acquisition numbers and skills were a challenge for 
all contracting agencies operating in Iraq, but the DoD, in particular, suffered from 
insufficient contracting personnel in theater, as well as problems ensuring that contracting 
personnel possessed the requisite skills to operate in a contingency contracting environment 
(SIGIR, 2006). The SIGIR report noted that the DoD’s contracting staff lacked experience in 
large construction contracts, a critical component of a contingency focused on reconstruction. 
The report quoted an official from the JCC–I who believed that deployment of contracting 
                                                 
7 Three of the convicted CCOs were Army Reservists, although their civilian salary information is unknown. 
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personnel was tied to the need to “have a warm body” and not necessarily to skills (SIGIR, 
2006, p. 108). The Gansler Report emphasized, “Contracting personnel sent into a theater of 
operations need to be highly skilled, adequately trained, and prepared for the challenging, 
fast-paced demands of expeditionary operations” (Gansler et al., 2007, p. 6). It further 
concluded that the Army, even after six years enduring less than optimal contracting 
outcomes in theater, was failing to support its mission in Iraq and Afghanistan: 
There are far too few Army contracting personnel in-theater. According to the 
JCC–I/A Commander, even those that are there are not adequately qualified 
for their responsibilities: only 38 percent of the total Army 
Acquisition/Contracting Workforce in-theater are certified for the positions 
held; and, overall, Army contracting people mostly are not certified for the 
position occupied. (Gansler et al., 2007, p. 28) 
Personnel issues were compounded by high turnover, among not only 
contracting personnel, but also legal support. A senior DoD contracting official observed, 
“many of the lawyers did not have contracting backgrounds or the temperament and 
experience to work in a war zone. Instead, they were all trying to learn on the job” (SIGIR, 
2006, p. 108). High personnel turnover can impact a CCO’s rationalization process. They 
may believe that due to the continuous change out of personnel, it is less likely they will be 
caught. Additionally, CCOs may feel less accountable and, therefore, less obligated to act 
ethically due to the short-term nature of the relationships formed between themselves and 
senior leadership or peers.  
4.  Control Mechanisms 
a. Insufficient Internal Controls and Oversight 
Numerous reports cite poor oversight of both contractor and contracting 
personnel as the most significant factor leading to fraud, waste, and abuse in OIF and OEF. 
The shortage of contracting personnel and the shortage of supporting staff functions, 
including legal and auditing personnel, contributed to the perception of, if not actual, weak or 
nonexistent internal controls. Additionally, distributed operations, coupled with 
transportation challenges and security concerns, weakened supervision by senior contracting 
personnel and inspectors. CCOs, presented with the real or perceived autonomy provided by 
remote locations and poor communication systems, were presented with an increased 
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opportunity for fraud. The massive contracting fraud involving multiple CCOs in Kuwait, for 
instance, occurred in an environment in which contracts were “awarded by a small group of 
officers who seemed to be barely supervised by senior officers” (Millman, 2009). 
b. Lack of Formal Investigative Procedures/Protocols and Resources 
When the Army CID’s MPFU conducted its assessment of the contracting 
environment in Iraq in 2005, it found the fraud threat high for a variety of reasons, including 
the lack of a formal structure for reporting and investigating allegations of procurement fraud 
(Ethridge et al., 2007). Contracting operations had been taking place for more than three 
years before the MPFU established a fraud investigation office in Iraq in December 2005. 
Although the office was manned with trained special agents, most had never previously 
worked in a combat environment. As the increased requirement for investigative assets 
became known, the Army subsequently opened offices in Afghanistan and Kuwait, as well as 
an additional office in Iraq.  
Ultimately, the extent of fraud in theater necessitated the creation of a joint 
investigative task force, the International Contract Corruption Task Force (ICCTF), whose 
purpose was to coordinate efforts, share resources, and expand capabilities (Ethridge et al., 
2007). Members from the Army CID, Defense Criminal Investigative Services (DCIS), 
SIGIR, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) made up the ICCTF. The establishment 
of the MPFU, and later the ICCTF, was a critical, if belated, step in ensuring appropriate 
investigative resources were available in theater. The presence of these organizations in 
theater was an integral step in implementing formal protocols for reporting fraud, as well as 
potentially preventing fraud from occurring in the first place. As Colonel Joe Ethridge of the 
Army CID notes regarding special agents in a contingency operation,  
First, their mere visible presence will tend to deter procurement fraud. Second, 
they can work with procurement officials to identify weaknesses in 
contracting procedures and enhance awareness of fraud indicators before the 
situation gets out of hand. (Ethridge et al., 2007, p. 40) 
D. SUMMARY 
By examining the contracting environment in OIF and OEF and utilizing the 
conceptual framework of occupational fraud theory, specifically Cressey’s Fraud Triangle, I 
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was able to identify distinctive situational elements that influence a CCO’s decision to 
commit fraud and thus affect the probability of fraud occurring in contingency operations. 
My research indicates that the Fraud Triangle provides an efficient conceptual model to 
explain the Army CCO corruption in OIF and OEF. Figure 7 provides a summation of my 




Figure 7.   Fraud Triangle for Army CCOs in OIF and OEF 
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IV.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this chapter, I provide my research conclusions and recommend actions that the 
Army can take in an effort to prevent fraud, utilizing proven private sector methods with a 
basis in occupational fraud theory. Although the complete elimination of fraud in 
contingency operations may not be possible, taking a proactive approach and implementing a 
comprehensive anti-fraud program is the most effective way for the Army to decrease fraud 
occurrence by its CCOs.  
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Fraud has been, and continues to be, a real and widespread problem in OIF and OEF, 
as evidenced by the CWC’s estimate of $10.3–$18.5 billion. But the price tag tells only part 
of the story. More importantly, it reveals the corruption of a system designed to be fair, 
accountable, and transparent—a contracting system that enables mission critical operations to 
occur and, when compromised, risks soldiers’ lives and, ultimately, national security. The 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) recognizes the pernicious effects of corruption, 
noting it “hinders the development and undermines the security of modern societies and 
decreases trust in public institutions” (Tagarev, 2010, p. 3). Procurement fraud, including 
CCO corruption, has been a problem in OIF and OEF from the beginning. Yet even as 
operations in Iraq wind down, the number of people indicted and convicted for bribery and 
theft, among other crimes, continues to rise, as seen in Figure 8.  
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Figure 8.   SIGIR Investigations: Criminal and Monetary Results 
(SIGIR, 2011, p. 117) 
The SIGIR is just one of several agencies investigating fraud and criminal activities 
in theater. Table 7 shows that there are 376 open cases in Iraq and Kuwait for all 
investigative agencies as of September 30, 2011.  
 
Table 7.   Status of Investigative Activities of Other U.S. Agencies, as of  
September 30, 2011 
(SIGIR, 2011, p. 138) 
 
In Afghanistan, there are 111 open cases, of which about 61% involve contract fraud 
and 27% involve corruption and bribery (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 
Reconstruction [SIGAR], 2011, p. 24). However, the statistics regarding ongoing 
investigations do not provide a breakdown of how many personnel are Army CCOs. 
However, my research indicates that the Department of Justice has successfully prosecuted at 
least nine Army CCOs for fraud, with one CCO still pending trial. The current open case 
statistics indicate the persistent nature of fraud in OIF and OEF. Although the Army and the 
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DoD are obtaining improved metrics in fraud investigations, fraud prevention remains the 
greater and more cost-effective goal.  
1.  Answer to Research Question 
The primary objective of this research project was to answer the following question: 
How does occupational fraud theory account for the corruption of Army CCOs in OIF and 
OEF? My hypothesis was that occupational fraud theory could account for CCO corruption 
in OIF and OEF and could therefore offer insight into effective prevention methods. Based 
on my literature review identifying the fraud-influencing elements of the contingency 
contracting environment, and the application of the Fraud Triangle, I conclude that 
occupational fraud theory provides a valid explanation of CCO corruption in OIF and OEF.  
During the course of my research, I identified 14 unique elements of the contingency 
contracting environment: 
 waived contracting officer appointment standards, 
 less sophisticated local business practices/contractors, 
 cultural norms, 
 increased reliance on contractors, 
 cash-based business practices, 
 insufficient internal controls and oversight, 
 operational tempo, 
 increasing contract complexity, 
 utilization of manual contract methods, 
 pressure to award procurements faster, 
 insufficient number of trained personnel, 
 contracting not valued by the Army, 
 personal/financial hardships caused by deployment, and 
 high personnel turnover.  
These elements represent the perceived opportunities, pressures, and 
rationalizations—the Fraud Triangle’s three legs. Some of these elements are applicable to 
more than one characterization; however, in aggregate they represent the most frequently 
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cited factors of procurement fraud in OIF and OEF. The findings lead me to believe that 
many of the factors are not specific to OIF and OEF and therefore could be present in future 
contingency operations. With this in mind, I provide a variety of possible courses of action 
for the Army to take in countering future potential fraud. These recommendations support a 
proactive fraud prevention approach, which addresses all elements of the Fraud Triangle 
more effectively than the traditional, reactive-based approach. A comparison of the two 






Figure 9.   Comparison of Organizational Fraud Approaches 
Note. I created these graphics based on graphics found in Albrecht et al. 2006 (pp. 110–111). 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD THEORY 
Occupational fraud theory recognizes that numerous factors must work in congruence 
in order for organizations to be successful in their efforts to prevent fraud. Fraud prevention 
encompasses two fundamental activities: assessing the risk for fraud in order to eliminate 
opportunities via internal controls, and creating and maintaining a culture of honesty and 
ethics. 
Proactive Approach to 
Fraud 
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1.  Internal Controls 
In regards to limiting a fraudster’s opportunity, an organization must establish strong 
internal controls and, just as importantly, must enforce those controls. Some examples of 
internal controls include the following (Albrecht et al., 1995, p. 31): 
 segregation of duties, or dual custody, 
 system of authorizations, 
 independent checks, 
 physical safeguards, and 
 documents and records. 
a. Stricter Deployment and Warranting Procedures  
In February 2011, the Army instituted a policy mandating that a CCO have at 
least one year of operational contracting experience before deploying to ensure a minimum 
level of contracting proficiency (Director, Acquisition Career Management, 2011). This is a 
step in the right direction and implements the Gansler commission’s recommendation that 
expeditionary contracting should never be a first assignment (Gansler et al., 2007, p. 6). 
JCC–I/A now also has minimum warranting guidelines, based on contracting authority on 
education, certification, and experience (JCC–I/A, 2009). Other possible courses of action 
include formal warranting interviews or warrant boards. This provides the contracting 
leadership with an opportunity to assess firsthand a CCO’s technical competence, as well as a 
CCO’s ethical decision-making process. 
b. Proactive Fraud Auditing 
Organizations are rarely proactive in their audits for fraud and instead 
investigate fraud only if reported or otherwise discovered (Albrecht et al., 1995). However, 
organizations that undertake a proactive approach to fraud raise employee awareness that, at 
any time, their work is subject to review, which increases the fear (and probability) of getting 
caught. This response, in turn, decreases the likelihood of fraudulent behavior. The Army 
should establish routine procurement fraud assessments in addition to procurement 
management reviews for its contracting organizations, focused on identifying weaknesses in 
contracting procedures and recognizing fraud indicators. In addition to revealing potential 
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gaps, such assessments also serve to determine whether systems function as designed and 
whether organizations are enforcing existing controls. 
Because contracting is a data-rich environment, it is ideal for continuous 
monitoring applications. The Army should optimize the use of available forensic tools and 
data-mining techniques to identify contracting fraud. New automated programs can quickly 
identify irregular transactions and anomalies that are indicators of potential fraud instead of 
waiting for an audit to occur or a tip to come across a hotline. One example of such 
technological advances in proactive fraud auditing is the FERRET program, an acronym for 
Forensic Evaluation, Research, Recovery and Enforcement Team. FERRET is a program 
developed by the SIGIR that utilizes “investigative and audit techniques combining 
sophisticated data analysis with traditional investigative technique and coordination with 
organizations such as the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, or FINCEN, within the 
Department of Treasury” (Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
2010, p. 14). Utilizing this tool enabled the SIGIR to open 45 new investigations involving 
60 subjects.  
c. Deployable Automated Procurement System 
The SIGIR in its report, Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and 
Procurement, recommended that the DoD develop deployable contracting and procurement 
systems before mobilizing for post-conflict efforts and test them to ensure that they can be 
effectively implemented in contingency situations (SIGIR, 2006). After reconstruction 
operations began in Iraq, contracting entities developed ad hoc operating systems and 
procedures for monitoring contracts and maintaining contracting and procurement histories; 
this limited contracting efficiency and led to inconsistent documentation of contracting 
actions. 
The Gansler Report also noted the lack of eBusiness tools and found that 
existing contract writing systems were “insufficient and not standardized, negatively 
impacting the ability to accomplish the mission. Information systems to track contractor 
personnel, assets, and performance are critical but lacking” (Gansler et al., 2007, p. 7). 
Implementing a more effective suite of contracting program tools will not only improve 
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contracting operations but will also eliminate the possibility of manual system manipulation 
and facilitate data reporting in fraud audits. 
2.  Creating a Culture of Honesty and Ethics 
Although controls are important, the organization’s culture is also critical in 
preventing fraud by creating an environment of honesty and openness. Five factors essential 
to realizing such an environment are as follows (Albrecht et al., 1995, p. 255): 
 hiring honest people and the provision of fraud awareness training, 
 creating a positive work environment, 
 having a well understood and respected code of ethics, 
 providing an employee assistance program that helps employees deal with 
personal pressures, and 
 creating an expectation that dishonesty will be punished. 
These elements can affect an individual’s reactions to pressures and affect their 
rationalizations.  
a. Personnel 
One of the issues noted in the Gansler Report was that the Army lacked a 
defined and well-developed career path for military contracting professionals. In stark 
contrast to the Air Force, the Army does not allow officers or soldiers to enter the contracting 
field upon entering the Service. As a result, they are “not prepared to act as mentors; nor are 
they able to oversee and work on the more complex and high-dollar contract actions ... and 
do not have technical experience to command a contracting operation” (Gansler et al., 2007, 
p. 33). To address these problems, the Gansler Report recommended that the Army establish 
a separate, centrally managed contracting corps and conduct separate Army contracting 
promotion boards.  
The Army, however, did not implement either of these recommendations. 
Rather than creating a separate corps, the Army decided that its needs would be best met by 
ensuring that contracting expertise is shared across all acquisition corps disciplines (DoD 
Task Force, 2008, p. 25). Regarding separate promotion boards, the Army countered that the 
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intent could more effectively be met with special instructions to existing promotion boards, 
as it saw no added benefit to conducting separate boards because public law8 already required 
that the Army promote acquisition personnel at rates commensurate with the overall 
promotion rates. However, the Army did institute a policy to accelerate accession by two to 
three years. 
The Army asserts that a cross-functional acquisition corps is beneficial 
because officers move in and out of the contracting field and, in a sense, cross-pollinate the 
organization with contracting knowledge. In a recent interview, almost four years after the 
initial report, Gansler still advocated for a separate contracting corps, arguing that program 
management and contracting personnel are not interchangeable. He also expressed concern 
that major weapon systems procurement issues dilute the contracting command’s focus on 
contingency/expeditionary contracting (Army Contracting Command [ACC], 2011, p. 14). I 
recommend a reevaluation of Gansler’s recommended course of action in light of his 
concerns, and taking into consideration that the Army experienced a much higher incidence 
of CCOs committing fraud in OIF and OEF than other Services did, notably the Air Force. I 
recommend further research be conducted regarding the differences in the career paths, 
training, and ethical decision-making between the Services. 
b. Ethics Training  
The National Defense Authorization Act for 2007 directed the DoD to 
establish a panel on contracting integrity. This panel, made up of senior leadership across the 
DoD, was given the mandate to conduct an assessment of the DoD’s progress to eliminate 
fraud, waste, and abuse by eliminating vulnerabilities in the contracting process. The panel 
created a subcommittee to review integrity in a combat/contingent environment. The 
subcommittee found that 
the annual DoD mandatory ethics training is not sufficiently tailored to the 
integrity issues found in a combat/contingent environment and that DoD 
should increase the quality, availability, and frequency of contracting integrity 
training provided prior to and during deployment in a combat/contingent 
environment. ... Finally, the subcommittee found that deployed contracting 
                                                 
8 Goldwater–Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986, Public Law 99-433. 
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personnel do not always train as they fight, and are not all adequately prepared 
with the appropriate skill-sets to perform effectively. (DoD, 2007, p. 31) 
The Joint Ethics Regulation provides the DoD’s written policy establishing its 
ethics program (DoD, 1996). The purpose of the DoD’s ethics program is to emphasize 
“training and counseling to raise awareness of standards of ethical behavior and to prevent 
misconduct” (GAO, 2005, p. 4). It focuses primarily on post-government employee 
restrictions, financial disclosure requirements, and conflict-of-interest issues, and not 
necessarily situations that CCOs will find themselves confronting in a contingency 
environment. Tailoring ethics training toward contingency contracting operations is one way 
to improve. The Army should also keep in mind key features of effective training programs, 
which are based on the practices of 41 leading, U.S.-based, multinational companies, 
including the following (Ponemon, 1996, p. 66): 
 live instruction, 
 small class sizes, 
 decision-based focus, 
 use of a professional trainer, 
 powerful senior executive message, 
 realistic case materials, and 
 significant group interaction. 
An effective training program is the first line of defense in fraud awareness 
and prevention. The Gansler Report, in explaining the much higher ratio of Army contracting 
personnel involved in fraud versus Air Force personnel, suggested that “focused, in-depth 
training given U.S. Air Force personnel on Government contracting helps to prevent 
opportunistic, fraudulent behavior” (Gansler et al., 2007, p. 23). Even if the training offered 
fails to deter the fraudster, it may raise a team member’s or office mate’s awareness of fraud 
indicators and reporting procedures, increasing the probability that they will be able to 
identify and report the crime. 
c. Training for and by Senior Contracting Officials 
In addition to the recommendation that the Army should expand and improve 
its ethics training regarding contingency environments, the Army should also ensure that it 
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provide focused training for its senior contracting officials, including CCO team leaders and 
contracting battalion commanders. It is employees and managers, not auditors, who detect 
most frauds (Albrecht et al., 2006). Therefore, it behooves an organization to provide 
instruction on how to recognize the signs, or red flags, of fraud.  
The Army should also consider having contracting leadership personally 
instruct ethics and fraud prevention training. The legal staff, in its capacity as ethics advisors, 
traditionally do this task. If the contracting leadership provided the training, however, it 
would reinforce appropriate modeling, commonly referred to in the Army as the command 
climate or the tone at the top. Showing by example that fraud prevention and ethics training 
is important sends a clear message of expectations and standards. 
d. Assistance Program 
The stresses of multiple deployments and other military hardships, including 
frequent moves, can cause a CCO or family members to adopt negative coping mechanisms, 
including drug and alcohol abuse, gambling, excessive spending, and domestic violence. 
These behaviors, in turn, can provide the pressure to commit fraud. Although there are 
already programs, including chaplains and mental health counseling, in place to assist service 
members with various personal issues, contracting leadership and the routine pre- and post-
deployment training should reinforce the availability of these services.  
Additionally, contracting leaders who build a strong relationship with their 
CCOs are better positioned to notice changes in a CCO’s behavior resulting from dealing 
with a pressure. Increased awareness and monitoring of personal situations could result in a 
leader ensuring that a CCO with a “nonsharable” problem receive appropriate assistance. 
This awareness would prevent leadership from putting a CCO in a position in which the three 
elements of the Fraud Triangle are present, which increases the probability that a crime such 
as fraud is committed. The restructuring of Army contracting to mirror traditional Army units 
should facilitate this by enabling closer proximity between CCOs and their leadership, and 
potentially creating a closer bond between them as well.  
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e. Established Relationships With Investigative Agencies 
From its experience with fraud, including the corruption of CCOs in OIF and 
OEF, Army leadership has since realized the value in having auditors and criminal 
investigators present at the beginning of a contingency operation. According to General 
Thompson, the Army is considering including auditors and criminal investigators “as part of 
the deployable structure, both to have that presence there from the beginning, and also to act 
as a deterrent” (Department of Defense Appropriations, 2009, p. 23).  
Another recommendation is to establish a permanent office of the inspector 
general for contingency operations. Although departments like the DoD and the Department of 
State have their own respective IGs, their authority is limited. The temporary special inspectors 
general, SIGIR and SIGAR, are similarly restricted by time and function. According to the CWC, 
which supports the establishment of a permanent office, 
Having a small, but expandable, permanent inspector-general staff devoted to 
contingency operations would provide critical monitoring from the onset of a 
contingency, permit collaboration with agency inspectors general to regularly 
assess the adequacy of agency planning and coordination for contingencies, 
and provide a logical center for developing and coordinating needed training 
among agencies. (Thibault et al., 2011b, p. 9) 
f. Expectation of Punishment 
Despite the growing number of investigations, few cases of wartime-
contracting fraud are actually prosecuted. Many cases are simply closed, due to a lack of 
evidence, the difficulty investigating them, and the cost of prosecution (Thibault et al., 
2011b). Although prosecution can be time-consuming and expensive, not prosecuting a 
corrupt CCO or other government personnel sends the wrong message—that fraud is 
tolerated. The lack of prosecution can give other CCOs “a ‘perceived opportunity’ that when 
combined with pressure and rationalization, will result in additional frauds” (Albrecht et al., 
1995, p. 39). Opportunity is removed when perpetrators believe they will be punished, not 
just discovered.  
Having a strong policy of punishment can also help overcome a CCO’s 
rationalizations. To send the message that fraud will be prosecuted, the Army should 
consider creating a multi-faceted media campaign and include the actual cases of CCOs 
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prosecuted and convicted in ethics and other training in order to “communicate consistent 
expectations about punishment of violators” (Albrecht et al., 2006, p. 68). Examples of 
initiatives include the expanded use of public service announcements on the Armed Forces 
Network (AFN), which was available in Iraq and Afghanistan, and posters and hotline 
information posted near key target-population areas, such as dining facilities and contracting 
offices. 
g. Comprehensive Anti-Fraud Program 
As there are many factors involved in preventing fraud, an organization must 
address fraud prevention in a holistic manner. Focusing on one factor alone—ensuring 
adequate internal controls, for instance—is not enough. To be successful, an organization 
should understand the elements of the Fraud Triangle and implement measures addressing all 
three. Although ensuring adequate internal controls is a necessary step in eliminating 
opportunities, an organization should also focus on the pressures motivating fraud and on the 
rationalizations of the perpetrators, although these are potentially more difficult to identify 
and address. Since the Army discovered massive fraud in its CCO ranks, it has implemented 
much more stringent contracting controls, including mandatory peer, management, policy, 
and legal reviews. In some cases, it has removed contracting authority from CCOs 
completely; for example, the Army transferred the award and administration of large-dollar 
contracts from Kuwait to the U.S. Army Sustainment Command in Rock Island, IL 
(Department of Defense Appropriations, 2009, p. 9). 
In an effort to improve support, as well as to establish oversight through the 
chain of command, the Army also reorganized its contracting structure, creating an 
Expeditionary Contracting Command with contracting brigades, battalions, and teams. It has 
also expanded its CCO ranks in an effort to address the personnel shortage. These efforts 
should positively affect the fraud environment during a contingency operation. In other 
regards, however, the DoD has taken a short-term, piece-meal approach to dealing with 
fraud. Publishing an article, developing a web-cast, and holding a conference are all 
examples of actions that the Panel on Contracting Integrity touted as accomplishments in 
2009 (Department of Defense, 2009). It is doubtful these efforts, although praise-worthy, will 
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have any significant, long-term effect on preventing fraud in future contingencies. Similarly, 
the GAO observed that although the DoD has announced various new policies, guidance, and 
training initiatives to alleviate problems in contingency contracting, not all have been 
implemented, and for real and lasting change to occur, sustained leadership and commitment 
is required (GAO, 2011a, p. 7). 
C. SUMMARY 
Acts of fraud and abuse, especially if they go unpunished, erode morale, invite 
cynicism, encourage others to cheat, and undermine America's standing 
among allies and host nations. 
(Commission on Wartime Contracting, 2010, p. 2) 
 
The purpose of this report was to analyze the conditions that enabled corruption of 
Army CCOs during OIF and OEF by applying occupational fraud theory, specifically the 
classic sociological/criminological Fraud Triangle model (Cressey, 1953), to determine its 
validity in a contingency operation. From my research, I conclude that the Fraud Triangle 
model does provide a valid framework in accounting for CCO corruption based on the unique 
pressures, opportunities, and rationalizations that contracting in a contingency environment 
creates.  
By examining the contracting environment in OIF and OEF and utilizing the 
conceptual framework of occupational fraud theory, I identified the distinctive situational 
elements of a contingency operation that influence an individual’s decision to commit fraud 
and thus affect the probability of fraud occurring in contingency operations. My intent in 
analyzing the procurement fraud environment in OIF and OEF using an occupational fraud 
model was to provide a foundation for understanding why fraud occurs in the context of 
contingency operations in order to prevent procurement integrity violations in the future. 
Although corruption is virtually inevitable to some extent in any contingency environment, 
much of the contingency-contract waste and fraud in OIF and OEF could have been avoided, 
according to the CWC (Thibault et al., 2011b). Understanding the factors involved in how 
and why a CCO may decide to commit fraud is critical to preventing fraud in future 
contingency operations.  
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Establishing a comprehensive anti-fraud program, including the implementation of 
appropriate prevention and detection measures, is the most effective way to reduce instances 
of fraud by CCOs. The Army’s failure to do so essentially constitutes a breach of the 
fiduciary duty to manage its resources, both people and money. Reducing CCO corruption is 
necessary if the Army wants to reestablish and maintain public confidence in its contingency 
contracting personnel’s abilities to spend taxpayer money legally and wisely. To this end, I 
have provided various recommendations to help the Army address the issue of CCO 
corruption. Applying appropriate counter-fraud measures will also positively affect the 
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APPENDIX A: ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS 
FRAUD CLASSIFICATION MODEL  
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APPENDIX B: OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD RED FLAGS 
Personal Characteristics Organizational Environment 
1. Unusually high personal debts 26. A department that lacks competent personnel 
2. Severe personal financial losses 27. A department that does not enforce clear lines of 
authority and responsibility 
3. Living beyond one’s means 28. A department that does not enforce proper 
procedures for authorization of transactions 
4. Extensive involvement in speculative investments 29. A department that lacks adequate documents and 
records 
5. Excessive gambling habits 30. A department that internal auditors do not frequently 
review 
6. Alcohol problems 31. Lack of independent checks (other than internal 
auditor) 
7. Drug problems 32. No separation of custody of assets from accounting 
for those assets 
8. Undue family or peer pressure to succeed 33. No separation of authorization of transactions from 
the custody of related assets 
9. Feeling of being underpaid 34. No separation of duties between accounting 
functions 
10. Dissatisfaction or frustration with job 35. Inadequate physical security in the employee’s 
department, such as locks, safes, fences, guards, etc. 
11. Feeling of insufficient recognition for job 
performance 
36. No explicit and uniform personnel policies 
12. Continuous threats to quit 37. Failure to maintain accurate personnel records of 
disciplinary actions 
13. Overwhelming desire for personal gain 38. Inadequate disclosures of personal investments and 
incomes 
14. Belief that job is in jeopardy 39. Operating on a crisis basis 
15. Close associations with suppliers 40. Inadequate attention to details 
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Personal Characteristics Organizational Environment 
16. Close associations with customers 41. Not operating under a budget 
17. Poor credit rating 42. Lack of budget review or justification 
18. Consistent rationalization of poor performance 43. Placing too much trust in key employees 
19. Wheeler-dealer attitude 44. Unrealistic productivity expectations 
20. Lack of personal stability; frequent 
job/residence changes 
45. Pay levels not commensurate with the level of 
responsibility assigned 
21. Intellectual challenge to “beat the system” 46. Inadequate staffing 
22. Unreliable communications and reports 47. Failure to discipline violators of company policy 
23. Criminal record 48. Not adequately informing employees about rules of 
discipline or codes of conduct within the firm 
24. Defendant in a civil suit (other than divorce) 49. Not requiring employees to complete conflict-of-
interest questionnaires 
25. Not taking vacations of more than two or three 
days 
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